Alwaght- The longest and most extensive war in 8-decade Israeli history ended with accepting a ceasefire on Gaza last week.
Now with the end of the war conditions in the occupied territories, attention is expected to return to the those responsible for security breach of October 7. Herzi Halevi, for example, in his resignation letter talked about shouldering the responsibility for army setback, showing that after 16 months, the public opinion is still waiting to determine the role of figures or institutions behind the big security, military, and intelligence failure that allowed Hamas attack.
On the other hand, after 16 months of war, the government and army have failed to realize the overt and covert aims of the war on Gaza, namely destruction of Hamas, release of war prisoners, permanent displacement of Palestinians from the coastal enclave, and at least seizure of the northern part of Gaza according to what is called the " generals' plan."
However, many have compared the consequences of the recent Israeli defeat in Gaza to the situation that followed the 33-day war with Hezbollah in 2006. One of the most important results of the 33-day war was the formation of the Winograd Commission to identify the factors that led to the defeat in the war. This commission had a profound impact on Israel’s domestic and military policies. Now, in light of the recent Gaza war, the question arises as to whether a similar commission of inquiry is likely to be formed, especially that the current internal conditions and foreign relations of the Israeli regime are much worse and more critical than in 2006.
This report examines the factors that could influence the decision to form such a commission.
Why was Winograd Commission formed?
After the 2006 war, Israel formed the commission to probe the reason of defeat in war against Hezbollah.
After questioning 70 senior Israeli political and military figures, including then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, the commission submitted its 15-page preliminary report to the Israeli cabinet on March 30, 2007.
Based on the results of the commission's investigation, Ehud Olmert, Amir Peretz (Defense Minister), and Dan Halutz (Chief of the General Staff of the Defense Forces) were identified as the main figures to blame for humiliating failure.
By holding Olmert responsible for making wrong decisions, Winograd admitted that Israel had launched the war against Lebanon without any preparation or clear plan or program for it.
However, the consequences of this defeat did not only hit the PM. His party Kadima, which had won a majority in the Knesset in 2006, also gradually disappeared from the political scene. The defense minister also accepted responsibility and resigned.
Winograd reflects Gaza war
Most of the factors, contexts, and reasons that came together to create the need to form a committee of inquiry into the 33-day war are also visible in the recent war in Gaza, with even higher degree.
1. Public discontentment and political pressure
Public and political reactions to the management of war is one of the most important factors that can lead to formation of an inquiry commission. Throughout the history of the Israeli regime, public and political reaction to the way wars were managed and the clarification of the authorities' responsibilities for defeat have played an important role in the formation of probe commissions.
After the second Lebanon war and the poor performance of the Israeli army against Hezbollah, public and media criticism increased sharply. Many Israelis and political officials demanded an investigation into the causes of the failures and the adoption of reforms. Public pressure and popular protests led to the formation of the Winograd Commission.
During the Gaza war in 2021, public and media reactions showed that many residents of the occupied territories were dissatisfied with the way the war was managed and the decisions made regarding military objectives and the regime's inability to confront Hamas' rocket attacks on Israeli settlements. However, in the end, no investigation committee was formed.
However, in the recent Gaza war, the discontentment with the performance of the Netanyahu cabinet and the army in the war is much worse. After the October 7 incident, calls have been made to form a commission of inquiry in Israel. According to the Haaretz newspaper, several members of the Knesset from different parties have called for the formation of a government commission to investigate the incident and identify those guilty of negligence. The Times of Israel reported that human rights organizations and victims' families have also joined these calls, highlighting the need for transparency and accountability.
After October 7 and throughout the war, the occupied territories were the scene of continuous public protests including the families of the prisoners against the way the crisis was dealt with and the government's lack of commitment to returning the prisoners. After the ceasefire agreement, this criticism has increased because such an agreement could have been reached months ago, and despite imposing more casualties and economic costs on the Israeli society, Netanyahu's promises about the destruction of Hamas and the victory in the war have not materialized, and therefore it is natural that public opinion demands accountability.
On the other hand, some government and military officials have opposed the formation of such a commission, believing that this measure could lead to the weakening of the morale of the security and military forces. However, public and political pressure for an independent investigation continues.
2. Problems hitting the military campaign management
Another driver of a probe commission is investigation of the performance of army and government officials at the time of crisis and detecting the possible setbacks affecting military decisions.
One of the main reasons for the formation of the Winograd Commission after the second Lebanon war was to identify serious problems in the planning, coordination and execution of military operations. The report of this committee stressed that there were major weaknesses in the decision-making process and the management of the war at the political and military levels, in particular, in the field of strategic planning, the readiness of forces and the appropriate use of military power.
Article 20 of the report emphasized that the Israeli army, due to weaknesses in decision-making at various levels of war management and the poor performance of the senior commander and the army, was unable to provide an effective military response to the challenge it had created for itself in the Lebanon war and, as a result, was unable to achieve military success.
The same faults and weaknesses are now being reported by the Israeli media and experts about Gaza war results. In the recent war, in addition to the serious initial differences in the coalition cabinet, first differences emerged between Netanyahu and war cabinet Minister Benny Gantz about negotiations and a prisoner swap deal. Then Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant clashed over waging war on Lebanon and accepting Israeli withdrawal from the southern border regions of Gaza in return for ceasefire months before the recent ceasefire agreement. Also differences between the politicians and military commanders made headlines several times. The vast majority of Israeli military experts and commanders stressed that the main cause of the confusion of the Israeli army in the Gaza Strip was Benjamin Netanyahu's vague and unrealistic goals for this war, which forced the army to enter a war of attrition without a clear vision.
The results of the ceasefire agreement at the end proved that the Israeli military has totally failed to realize its war goals and lost to the war management by the Palestinian resistance. Not only was Hamas not destroyed, but also Netanyahu agreed to negotiate and reach an agreement with it, and by accepting a complete withdrawal from Gaza, the Israeli prisoners will also be traded for a large number of Palestinian prisoners.
3. Repeat of failure of Israeli military strategy in war
Another reason that drove Winograd Commission was the need for investigating the failure of Israeli war strategy and proposing solutions. Calling military commanders delusional in considering Israel's air superiority as decisive in the war, the commission spoke of the need to end reliance on air power in future war strategy. This issue and others, too, applied to the failure of war strategies in the Gaza war, especially that the Israeli regime gravely failed to uncover and destroy Hamas military infrastructures, including the complicated network of tunnels. Each time Israeli forces claimed to have cleared a region from Hamas in the north, the movement's fighters successfully fired missiles at Israeli settlements or destroyed tanks.
