Alwaght- In recent weeks, the world community more than any other time has grown aware of the UAE role in the bloody crisis of Sudan that, according to the reports by the international institutions, has so far led to a humanitarian disaster with tens of thousands of casualties, millions of displaced civilians, and devastation of the nation's infrastructure. The footprint of the Emiratis in financial and logistical support to the Rapid Response Forces (RSF) commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo is observable in many reports published by the UN as well as Western media outlets like the BBC and Reuters.
But what is overlooked in this developing story is the security and military aspect of these supports, something that is as alarming as the behavioral models of the Israeli regime in Gaza, with the disparity that in Sudan we do not just have UAE's imitation of the Israeli regime, but also direct and coordinated cooperation of Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv behind the scene of the clashes in Africa and the Red Sea.
First area of influence: Yemen and Red Sea
A key foundation for the military alliance between the Israeli regime and the UAE was laid in the Yemen war and the Red Sea, even before Sudan became a factor. Shifting dynamics and rising threats in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa have caused the security interests of Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv to converge.
For both the UAE and Israeli regime, both with economies deeply reliant on maritime commerce, guaranteeing the security of Red Sea shipping lanes is vital. This makes their cooperation in this region the most complex and operational aspect of their partnership.
Working with the US and European allies, they are now collaborating in joint exercises and missions to counter the growing power of Yemen's Ansarullah Movement in the Red Sea and assert control over the Bab-el-Mandeb strait.
Network of strategic bases in Yemen
Since the Saudi-Emirati coalition invaded Yemen in March 2015, Israel has been one of the main actors of the war, with the purported aim being thwarting the threats posed to its security and economy in the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb and expanding the military foothold in this part of the region.
Israel views its economic survival as dependent on the Red Sea, with the port of Eilat on the Red Sea serving as its only maritime gateway. This has driven it to deepen ties with Red Sea littoral states. East African nations, particularly Eritrea, Djibouti, and Ethiopia, which oversee the Gulf of Aden and the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, are primary targets of this outreach. Following the Yemen war, reports emerged of Israeli intelligence operations in Eritrea and Djibouti, conducted in coordination with the UAE.
This military cooperation intensified with the onset of the Gaza war. When Yemeni forces, in solidarity with Gaza, launched a naval ban on Israel and began targeting commercial ships linked to Israel, maritime traffic through this crucial transit corridor that connects the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf and Asia plummeted.
In 2023, Tel Aviv conducted airstrikes in Sana'a in response to Ansarullah's attacks. According to some reports, Israel has shared security intelligence on Yemeni activities with the UAE, a collaboration that tightened after Emirati facilities were struck by Yemeni drones.
But despite the naval deployment of the US and NATO in the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb and intensive airstrikes on Yemen, on the ground these hostilities went nowhere to hit Ansarullah's capability to strike Israeli ships or fire missiles and drones into the occupied territories. This equation remains standing until full end of Gaza war and can be reactived anytime according to the will of their leadership.
Amid this situation, the UAE continues its efforts to expand the Israeli regime's military footprint in Yemen.
The latest development in Abu Dhabi's military cooperation with Tel Aviv in Yemen is the establishment of a network of new, rudimentary airstrips on strategic Yemeni islands and coastal sites (such as Perim, Zuqar, Bab-el-Mandeb , Abd al-Kuri, and Socotra). The island of Abd al-Kuri in the Socotra archipelago has become the site of a joint Israeli-Emirati intelligence base, something reported by Israeli media outlets like Ma’ariv newspaper.
According to these reports, this network of airstrips has been built in recent years with high potentials to enhance maritime security along the vital Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC). Two main airport clusters have been constructed: one overlooking the southern end of the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, and the other overseeing the southern flank of the corridor in the Gulf of Aden.
Between these two clusters, Emirati bases in Berbera and Bosaso monitor the corridor's southern and western ends. While unconfirmed officially, all these airstrips appear to have been built with Emirati funding. The construction companies involved, as well as the vessels transporting supplies to the islands, are all linked to the UAE. Given the remote locations and a complete lack of basic infrastructure, building materials, equipment, and personnel were shipped in directly.
The Emirati funder of these projects, either the defense ministry or a relief or humanitarian organization, is unclear yet. However the reluctance to accept the responsibility to these activities shows that the implementing body is bound to the security and defense areas, especially that all of the faraway Islands and regions in which the airstrips are built are under the control of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC).
STC relies heavily on the UAE for financial and military backing and has politically aligned itself with the Abu Dhabi's strategy for fragmenting Yemen to ensure this support continues. It remains unclear whether the airstrip program is a direct UAE initiative or an STC project with Emirati support; the STC lacks the resources to undertake an operation of this scale alone.
Given the decades of neglect these remote islands suffered under successive Yemeni governments, and the challenges of supporting the small, fishing-dependent communities there, it is highly unlikely that the Aden-based cabinet would take the lead in such a construction program.
This network of airstrips in the southern Red Sea could be supported by the UAE's base in Assab, Eritrea, or by Yemen's recently expanded civilian airport in Mocha. The Perim airport, completed in 2021, occupies a highly strategic position at the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait's narrowest point. The Zuqar airport, on the archipelago's northernmost island, was hastily constructed with its runway carved directly through the main village. It overlooks the southern approaches to the Ansarullah-controlled ports of Hudaydah, Salif, and Ras Issa, roughly 55 nautical miles to the north.
The Bab-el-Mandeb airport, on the Yemeni coast south of Mocha, was built between March 2023 and February 2025. Located in a remote and sparsely populated area, it appears to be military in nature and could serve as a backup or replacement for the Perim facility.
This airport lies within a maritime area controlled by the National Resistance Front, led by Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, an STC ally.
A key operational detail is that the airstrips on Zuqar, Perim, and Dhubab feature relatively short runways. This makes them suitable for C-130 and C-295 military transport planes, the aircraft used for logistics and maritime patrol, as well as for small planes and drones. However, they do not suit regular fighter jet or attack aircraft operations.
To date, no fighter or attack aircraft have been spotted at any of these sites. All the airstrips are coastal, making them difficult to defend, and they lack the infrastructure for prolonged air operations. Their design suggests a primary function: to support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drones on short, rapid-turnaround missions.
In fact, satellite imagery has yet to identify any fixed-wing aircraft at these locations, with the sole exception of a single drone observed at Perim airport some time ago.
This pattern repeats at airstrips in the Socotra archipelago, which likely receive support from the Emirati air base on Hadibu.
The runways on Abd al-Kuri and Samha, the latter of which remains under construction, are exceptionally rudimentary. They are bare strips of pavement, completely lacking support infrastructure, hangars, or operational facilities.
These bases put under their operation and surveillance cover key positions in Bab-el-Mandeb and areas opposite of the ports controlled by Ansarullah. They bear the potential to be transformed into operational bases for intelligence gathering, marine blockade operations, and support to the local allies like the STC.
Further evidence points to Emirati-Israeli collaboration in constructing these Yemeni airstrips, with the partnership solidifying after the Israeli military chief met with American and Emirati commanders in June 2024.
Attacks on Sana'a
Reports suggest that during the Israeli airstrikes on Yemen in 2025, that targeted the residential areas in Sana'a and ports in Hudaydah, as well as the fuel storages, Abu Dhabi engaged in intelligence cooperation with Tel Aviv.
Joint war drills
Air and naval forces of Israel and Emirates have taken part in joint war games both in Greece and Persian Gulf.
Second area of influence: Sudan
In Sudan, the cooperation is more indirect, focusing on long-term geopolitical goals. Direct contact between Israel and Sudanese factions remains officially unconfirmed. However, with the UAE's extensive economic interests in Sudan and Israel's prior push for normalization, an alignment of their intelligence and economic interests is almost inevitable. In practice, Israeli influence manifests less through overt military action and more through its indirect ties with the UAE and its leverage over Red Sea ports and the gold trade.
1. The UAE as mediator: Emirates played a pivotal role in persuading Sudan's Sovereignty Council to normalize relations with Israel.
2. Severing Hamas's Supply Chain: A primary objective of drawing Sudan into this alliance's orbit was to cut a key logistical route for smuggling weapons to Gaza.
3. Economic and intelligence penetration: A significant part of Israel's military involvement in Sudan, including weapons and drone shipments, is channeled through its partnership with the UAE. However, a 2022 investigative report by Haaretz revealed that Israel delivered "advanced EU-made surveillance equipment" to the RSF via a private jet. In the current conflict, some Sudanese analysts, alongside highlighting the UAE's role, acknowledge Israeli interference. Sudanese journalist Abdel Rahman Ismail has stated that the genocide in Sudan is part of the effort to realize the "Greater Israel" project.
Tools and mechanisms of military cooperation
1. Industrial-defense cooperation
Since the normalization pact was signed in 2020 between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv, their military cooperation grew on par with their security and intelligence partnership. A clear example is opening a branch on Monday in Abu Dhabi Free Zone for Controp Precision Technologies with $30 million investment forocal production or assembly of advanced monitoring optical systems. The company has lately received a green light by the Israeli government to expand its business into the UAE.
According to a report by Maariv, the new entity, Controp UAE Limited, will be fully owned by its Israeli parent company and based in Abu Dhabi's Global Market free trade zone. This move will enable it, for the first time, to locally manufacture and market its advanced electro-optical surveillance systems within the Persian Gulf region.
The contract will focus on the sale, maintenance, technical support, and local assembly of Controp's surveillance and targeting systems, which are used for defense, homeland security, and border control.
The establishment of Controp's Emirati arm underscores the continuing expansion of military-industrial cooperation between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi under the Abraham Accords.
This is not the first such collaboration. The UAE's state-owned defense conglomerate, EDGE Group, has previously partnered with Israeli firms like Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, Elbit Systems, and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) on projects involving counter-drone technology, air defense, radar systems, and electronic warfare solutions. In 2023, IAI signed a contract with EDGE to jointly develop automated systems and counter-drone technologies for regional customers.
Meanwhile, Rafael has explored cooperative programs in air defense and cybersecurity, and other Israeli companies, including Elbit Systems, have participated in defense trade events in Abu Dhabi, such as the International Defence Exhibition (IDEX).
2. Sharing intelligence and training
Following normalization, Israeli defense exports to the UAE surged, particularly in military technology, drones, electronic systems, and missile defense. Reports indicate a series of joint contracts and projects between defense firms from both sides.
The UAE and Israeli air forces have participated alongside each other in various international military drills including INIOCHOS in Greece. Additionally, their navies have joined multi-nation drills in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea with the presence of the US and some Arab countries.
Furthermore, the UAE has utilized technology from Israeli firms like the NSO Group, the creator of the Pegasus spyware, for domestic surveillance, targeting dissidents, and even spying on other nations.
3. Security diplomacy
Trading regular meetings by senior military and security officials meant for strategic coordination is another aspect of their cooperation.
Conclusion
The security and military alliance between the UAE and Israel has now become a cornerstone of the West Asia's security architecture. Forged by a shared perception of threats from Iran and radical Islamism, as well as mutual economic opportunities, this partnership has expanded beyond pure defense and evolved into a comprehensive strategic alliance.
This alliance is seeking to redefine Wesia Asia and Horn of Africa geopolitical map and set up a new axis of power. This cooperation has indeed left destructive impacts on stability of the target countries like Yemen and Sudan, with its effects to keep reverberating in the regional developments for years to come.
