Alwaght- A week to the country's most important political event this year, Iraq is scene to extensive election competitions and campaigns of the candidates for the sixth parliamentary elections. For a broader picture, Alwaght has discussed the elections with Iraq affairs expert Sina Alizadeh.
Alwaght: First have your say on the significance of this vote and its differences with the previous ones. What is you assessment of Iraq's political landscape on the eve of the 2025 vote?
Alizadeh: To get a picture of the importance of the elections in Iraq, we should first take a look at the new electoral law. Meanwhile, the most important factor in the political formation and composition of key actors is the type of coalitions. The Iraqi electoral system is based on a form of proportional representation known as the Sainte-Laguë method, which is governed by the national election law.
The current electoral framework was largely shaped by the aftermath of the widespread 2019 protests, which led to the resignation of Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi's government. This pivotal moment resulted in the adoption of a new election law, widely endorsed by independent representatives. This law significantly altered the dynamics of coalition-building and the distribution of parliamentary seats. A key distinction of the 2021 elections was the use of an open-list system without a vote transfer mechanism, which empowered independent candidates and consequently diminished the political weight of traditional large parties and coalitions.
The outcome of the 2021 vote reflected this shift, with independents securing 54 seats. Interestingly, many established political factions, despite gathering a substantial number of votes overall, found that their candidates were unable to secure parliamentary entry due to the new electoral calculus.
However, the post-2021 period was marked by significant political gridlock, particularly within the Shiite political bloc. This stalemate escalated to the point where a quasi-coup attempt was staged in the streets by certain political factions. The crisis culminated when Moqtada al-Sadr withdrew his bloc of 73 parliamentarians from the legislature. This power vacuum ultimately allowed the Shiite Coordination Framework (SCF) to coalesce with other Shiite factions, Sunnis, and Kurds and formed the government of current Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al-Sudani.
Learning from that experience, the election law was amended ahead of the 2023 provincial elections. A critical reform under this amendment was the reduction of electoral districts from 83 to just 18, effectively making each province a single electoral constituency. This change is widely expected to curtail the influence of independent candidates and restore the primary power to the traditional political parties. Furthermore, leading figures like al-Sudani, EX-PM Nouri al-Maliki, and ex-parliament speaker al-Halbousi can play a key role in securing the seats.
To illustrate, if we assume that in Baghdad constituency al-Sudani wins 1 million votes, he can enter the parliament with 100,000 votes and the other can be shared with other members of his list and those low-ranking can enter the parliament taking advantage of the remaining 900,000. So, it is possible that in a list of another coalition whose list head had secured less votes than al-Sudani, candidates with more votes cannot enter the parliament.
Elections in Iraq have always been of great importance, as they determine the political weight of different factions and have a major influence on the country’s political, economic, and security decisions. This particular round, taking place after two years of significant transformations in West Asia, carries even greater significance. In the run-up to the elections, the United States has intensified political pressure on the Iraqi government—especially targeting the Resistance groups—to the point of blocking the approval of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) law and imposing sanctions on several Resistance factions and leaders.
All these developments underscore the crucial role of the resistance groups in Iraq. For this reason, senior American officials have been warning that the PMF should be dissolved and that weapons must remain solely in the hands of the government. Recently, they have even claimed that the PMF should not participate in the elections, attempting to weaken Iraq’s Resistance through such threats. Therefore, these elections are particularly important because if an anti-resistance faction comes to power, parliamentary pressure against the resistance groups will likely intensify, making this electoral round highly consequential for the Iraqi Resistance.
Alwaght: Compared to the 2021 elections, what are the differences in the campaigns, slogans, and election discourse? How serious and effective is the presence of independent and young candidates?
Alizadeh: In each time, we have seen a dominant discourse in the Iraqi elections. For instance in post-ISIS period, security discourse was leading and in such a climate, Al-Fatah coalition, affiliated with resistance groups, gained more votes than in previous votes. Now the dominant discourse is development, growth, abd reconstruction. The leader of this discourse is the PM al-Sudani. It seems that he will secure a larger share given his list of candidates.
Alwaght: Reports point to the very large sum of $9 billion in expenses for this forthcoming election. How real is this amount and where does this come from and what effects can it have?
Alizadeh: Based on reports, the cost of this electoral cycle is exceptionally high, with an allocated figure of 9 billion dollars considered close to reality. Furthermore, substantial funds from certain foreign powers are being funneled into Iraq. These resources are being used to buy votes and even to co-opt influential figures and potential representatives. Expert analysis confirms that this has been the most costly election cycle to date. According to the new election law, this influx of foreign money is poised to significantly influence the outcome. For instance, channeling funds to tribal leaders to direct votes towards specific lists is a method that could secure more seats for candidates favored by these external actors.
Alwaght: What are the most important coalitions and political currents present in this election? Is there a specific surprise in formation of these coalitions?
Alizadeh: Regarding the main coalitions, within the Shiite political bloc, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani leads the State of Reconstruction and Development coalition, Nouri al-Maliki heads the State of Law coalition, Ammar al-Hakim leads the Al-Hikma Movement; and Hadi al-Amiri runs independently through the political wing of the Badr Organization. The Al-Sadiqoon list, led by Qais al-Khazali, is also among the main blocs, fielding candidates in many provinces.
There are also regional coalitions active in certain provinces or local alliances in contested areas such as Kirkuk. For instance, the Nineveh First coalition has been formed in Nineveh, while the governor of Wasit has entered the elections independently under the Wasit is Better with Services coalition. Other notable examples include the Al-Badeel civil coalition, which is pro-Western and opposed to Iran.
In the Sunni political sphere, the main alliances include the Taqaddum coalition led by Mohammed al-Halbousi, the Al-Siyada coalition led by Khamis al-Khanjar, the Azm coalition led by Muthanna al-Samarrai, the Tafawoq coalition led by Ibrahim al-Jubouri, and the Al-Qiyada coalition led by Mahmoud al-Mashhadani.
One of the potential surprises in this election could be al-Sudani’s coalition. In the previous elections, it secured only two parliamentary seats, but it now enjoys a broader popular base, particularly in Baghdad’s Sadr City. There appears to be a degree of overlap between the supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr and those of al-Sudani, with the latter also reportedly receiving Sadr’s tacit approval.
Al-Sudani has had a key role in fighting corruption and in the Iraqi society, he is known as one of the cleanest politicians. He has formed a coalition in these elections and has activated his discourse of development over the past three years. He has rebuilt the infrastructures and so has a relatively successful record. In his list, al-Sudani has formed a powerful coalition that includes 54 current members of parliament, alongside prominent figures such as Faleh al-Fayyad, Ahmed al-Asadi, the civil movement of Ayad Allawi, and several other influential personalities. This strong lineup is expected to make al-Sudani’s coalition one of the major surprises of the elections, with the potential to secure a significantly larger number of seats.
Another notable surprise is Mohammed al-Halbousi’s candidacy in the Baghdad constituency. In previous elections, he had always run from his home province of Anbar, but this time he is contesting in Baghdad. With the potential to win a large portion of the Sunni vote in the capital, al-Halbousi could secure additional seats and possibly emerge as the second or third top candidate from the Baghdad constituency.
A third surprise could be the loss of several seats by Shiite factions. Due to the boycott of the elections by al-Sadr’s movement and several other civil and political groups, voter turnout is expected to decline, particularly within Shiite-majority areas, with noticeable effects in Baghdad. In the Kurdistan Region as well, some Kurdish parties have called for an election boycott, which will likely lead to a lower turnout there too.
Conversely, higher participation is expected among Sunni voters, partly influenced by recent regional developments. With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government and the rise of Sunni-led movements in Syria, Iraq’s Sunni population, owing to geographic proximity and cultural ties, has been inspired by these shifts, contributing to a likely increase in their voter turnout.
Moreover, the recent passage of the General Amnesty Law by Sunni representatives, which led to the release of more than 35,000 prisoners convicted of various offenses, has further boosted enthusiasm among Sunni communities. Many of those freed see their release as a result of the efforts of current Sunni leaders in parliament, generating goodwill and momentum for participation. While unexpected events in the coming days could still alter turnout dynamics nationwide, for now, the overall atmosphere suggests a decline in voter turnout across Iraq.
Alwaght: How do you see the role of the Shiite Coordination Framework? Can it maintain its internal unity in these elections?
Alizadeh: At present, we are seeing gaps with the Shiite Coordination Framework, but we hope these are just superficial rather than deep. In the previous elections, we saw competition inside and coalition outside the Shiite camp. But now we are seeing competition outside it. Just unlike in the past that they gave a united list, this time they have given several separate lists.
The emergence of post-election cohesion within Shiite Coordination Framework depends on several key factors. If any member of the Framework achieves a sweeping victory, similar to the Sadrist movement in the previous election, internal divisions are likely to deepen. Given the current external pressures, the Shiite Coordination Framework is increasingly concerned about the potential costs of a political deadlock after the elections and how such a scenario could harm the Shiite community’s interests. Therefore, if the Framework’s leaders come to prioritize national and communal interests over personal ambitions, they will be able to maintain unity and prevent fragmentation.
Alwaght: What is the outstanding figure for next PM post? Who do you think have the biggest chances? How do you see the survivability of PM al-Sudani?
Alizadeh: For the post of prime minister, several names have been put forward, including Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, Nouri al-Maliki, Abdul Amir al-Shammari (Iraq’s current interior minister), Othman al-Ghanimi (former interior minister), Asaad al-Eidani (governor of Basra), and a few other figures. It is still too early to make definitive statements about al-Sudani’s continuation in office, but past experience has shown that the number of parliamentary seats does not necessarily determine who becomes prime minister. For instance, Mustafa al-Kadhimi became prime minister despite holding no seats in parliament, and al-Sudani himself rose to the position with only two seats, while Haider al-Abadi, despite winning 40 seats, failed to secure the post. So, it does not seem al-Sudani can secure this post outside the sphere of the Shiite Coordination Framework and he needs coordination with this bloc dir survival.
Alwaght: Al-Sadr is still asserting his boycott of the elections. Essentially, what is his game and what does he seek? Will his insistence on his stance meet large-scale popular backing?
Alizadeh: Boycotting the elections by the nationalist Sadrist movement does not come with the aim of full departure from the politics, but indicates a strategy of influencing the politics from outside the official political system. The main axis of activity for this movement after the elections will center on mobilizing popular support and applying street pressure, alongside investing in social media networks, charitable organizations, religious institutions, and local community structures to strengthen loyal backing among its core base, primarily the impoverished Shiite population and residents of Sadr City.
By staying away from the government formation process and maintaining his image as an “anti-corruption opposition,” al-Sadr positions himself as a national savior. He seeks to leverage his ability to mobilize supporters, particularly during periods of political crisis, public dissatisfaction, declining political legitimacy, or economic hardship (such as drops in oil prices), to place constant pressure on the new government and parliament, using the street as a tool to extract political concessions.
In addition to this street pressure, the Sadrist movement will continue to exert influence indirectly through its networks within state institutions and informal lobbying. Sadr’s followers and cadres, embedded in the mid-level ranks of various institutions, will remain important levers of influence. Moreover, al-Sadr is expected to focus on strengthening his religious and social base to establish his legitimacy beyond partisan politics, seeking to position himself as a major religious and national authority in post-Sistani Iraq. By emphasizing Iraqi nationalism and opposition to foreign interference, including openly criticizing non-state armed groups, al-Sadr aims to sustain his image as a cross-factional leader in Iraq’s political arena.
The Sadrist movement remains a deeply rooted and significant force within Iraq’s Shiite community. Therefore, maintaining and reintegrating this movement into the political process would greatly benefit the cohesion and strength of the Shiite bloc, while its exclusion would be entirely detrimental to Shiite unity.
Alwaght: On the ever of elections, how much is the interference of the foreign actors like the US and Arab countries?
Alizadeh: We can see that Turkey, Qatar, the UAE, and the United States through big money injection in Iraqi political circles are seeking to tip the scales in Iraq in their own favor. Concerning the United States, we can say that Iraq is structurally under the American occupation since Baghdad's economic, security, and political structures are under the dominance of Washington. So, by putting economic and political pressures, the Americans can influence major Iraqi policies.
With Donald Trump’s return to power, the balance that once existed between Iraq and the United States has effectively been disrupted. The Trump administration’s guiding slogan is “you’re either with us or against us.” Within this framework, Iraq is being pressured to distance itself from Iran. To achieve this objective, Washington has resorted to economic sanctions and security threats aimed at undermining Baghdad–Tehran relations.
All Iraqi public-sector employees are paid by the government, and according to estimates, around $5 billion in salaries are distributed monthly. These payments come from oil revenues, which are first deposited in the United States Federal Reserve Bank before being transferred to Iraq on a monthly basis. Therefore, if the economic lever were activated against Baghdad, meaning that these dollar transfers were delayed or halted, the value of the dollar would sharply rise against Iraqi dinar, deepening the country’s economic crisis. Knowing this, any individual securing Iraq’s prime minister will inevitably have to cooperate with the American government.
In general, the forthcoming elections are a moment of truth for Iraq's unity, strengthening of Shiite position in the power structure, and continuation of the Iraqi pivotal role in the Axis of Resistance in the face of evil American-Zionist plans. Failure of the resistance groups in this vote can throw Iraq into the abyss of the American and allies' dominance, pave the way for Greater Israel project, tighten Iran blockade, and weaken the bonds of the Axis of Resistance, as the United States is seeking to undermine this anti-imperialim axis using its political, economic, and electoral instruments.
