Alwaght- While the Turkish government seeks to achieve a variety of objectives through recent change in its foreign policy; this change might backfire and create new challenges for the security of this country.
The current U-turn in policy of the Turkish leadership seems to have begun with introducing the changes in policies towards ISIS and striking its terrorists. In practice, Turkey has primarily focused on suppressing and limiting the Kurds, especially now that some new terrorist activities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) have made way for such excuses. While the government has suspended peace talks with PKK, the main armed force of the Kurdish group, Turkey has begun violent attacks against them. Since 2013, the PKK and the government had announced a cease-fire, conducting peace negotiations to determine the legal status of the Kurds and eliminate the discrimination against the Kurds.
Nevertheless, the judiciary in Turkey has litigated a case against Selahattin Demirtaş, the co-leader of the People's Democratic Party in Turkey, another sign of increasing pressure on the Kurds which could only be justified in the framework of policy change in Turkish leadership. Pressure on the co-leader of the People's Democratic Party and resuming the process of lifting the immunity of members of the party in the parliament (Grand National Assembly), are only a part of the preparations made to achieve the national and regional objectives of the Turkish ruling party. The new U-turn in the policies of the Justice and Development party (AKP), which seemingly began in collaboration with US-led coalition against ISIS has other important aspects too.
Turkey's pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party which represents the majority of the Kurds in Turkey, for the first time succeeded to break the quorum of ten percent of the votes through its slogans and attracting the support of more people in the June election, and consequently won 80 seats in the Turkish Parliament.
This victory was proved detrimental to the share of votes the AKP wished to win. The ruling party which used to have an absolute majority in parliament was trying to win a greater share of votes in the June election so that it can attain its goals of changing the constitution. To change the parliamentary system to a presidential one and unprecedented expansion of Presidential powers of Recep Tayyip Erdogan were the core of the changes. According to critics, Erdogan, the charismatic figure of the ruling party, plans to remain in office with extensive power until 2024, the hundredth anniversary of founding the modern Turkey. He tries to conduct controversial and mega projects to fulfill his neo-Ottomanism in his society and record his name in the history of Turkey.
According to the Turkish constitution, two-thirds of the votes in the Grand National Assembly are required for a change in the constitution, and in this case there is no need for a referendum. If only three-fifths of the Parliament members vote for the change, the public should approve the decision in a referendum. However, AKP failed to win that share of votes and even lost the parliamentary majority it had held since 2002. AKP has to enter a coalition with other parties to form a government. No other part is willing to enter a coalition with AKP and help it change the constitution, or stop the trial of Erdogan's son on charges of financial corruption, whose case is being investigated in the judiciary.
For AKP, this situation is known as "election crisis". After the defeat in the parliamentary election, the leaders of the party have been trying to re-hold the election in the new conditions so that they can at least restore their previous position (absolute majority in the Parliament). Parts of the new changes in Turkish policy are aimed to create these conditions.
Therefore, the attacks on the PKK and the Kurdish forces close to it, including the People's Democratic Party, and declaring that "they have threatened Turkey's security" are actually aimed to weaken the position of the Kurds and other social forces close to their political groups. These are in line with a plan for the social mobilization of people for the new election. To prevent the People's Democratic Party to re-enter the Parliament is more or less in line with the goals of the ruling party to achieve the absolute majority, or even the votes needed to change the constitution.
Regional goals
Beyond the domestic political equations, there were more important motivations which have played a significant role in the new changes introduced in the policies of the Turkish ruling party. In recent weeks and months, the Kurdish forces have made considerable gains in the fight against ISIS in Syria. They almost have a total control over the border strip in northern Syria; they and have nearly joined the Kurdish areas in this border strip and even have continued it up to the Mediterranean coast. These conditions not only weaken the ISIS, the unofficial ally of Turkey against the Syrian government, and serve as an obstacle to the strengthening of the Syrian Kurds, but also put the Kurds in a situation which force them to stabilize their autonomous region in northern Syria. This experience in the autonomous region of Kurdistan in itself could have provided a new model for the Kurds in Turkey, but considering the strong bonds between the Syrian and Turkish Kurds and the influence of the PKK on the Syrian Kurds, it is considered seriously dangerous by Turkish government.
In such circumstances, the Ankara government has found an excuse to attack the PKK. Turkish government asked the US to create a 'no-fly zone' over the northern Syria. However, Washington only agreed to create a safe zone or a buffer zone in this part of Syria which is also in conflict with the interests and goals of the US ally, the Syrian Kurds. Nevertheless, the advantage of having access to Turkish air bases has outweighed the interests and demands of the Syrian Kurds. Some NATO countries, disagree with the new approach of Turkey particularly towards Kurds, considering it a threat to the stability and security of Turkey; but they are not powerful enough to overshadow Washington's accord with this policy, and make Ankara government stop following that policy.
Turkish forces strongly raided the PKK positions, ten times more powerful than what ISIS has done, and sometimes target the positions of the Syrian Kurds. Creating a buffer zone in northern Syria and transferring the Syrian Turkmens into the safe zone are aimed to further isolate the country's Kurdish areas and prevent the creation of a strong and stable autonomous Kurdish region. The Syrian Turkmens have been historically united with Turkey and the Ankara government knows itself their guardian and protector.
The Turkish government also have made plans to train Syrian armed opposition forces in the safe zone, in northern Syria where Turkey is likely to establish a shadow government against the President Assad government. The safe zone will naturally help other opposition forces within Syria to receive more support and aids.
In conclusion, the recent policy change pursued by Turkish leaders which seemingly has targeted the ISIS, is an attempt to fulfill several main objectives: to weaken the Kurds in Turkey, to disrupt the internal equations and strengthen the ruling party in the parliament, to facilitate change in the constitution, to prevent the formation of a new political structure for Syrian Kurds in the north of the country, and to get close to the AKP's longstanding goal of overthrowing the Syrian government.
Nevertheless, this policy change has already challenged the stability and security of Turkey. It has partially revived the tensions and bloody conflicts between the Kurds and the government which had occurred over the last thirty years, and has intensified dangerous ethnic and national divisions. In such circumstances, extremists groups such as ISIS, especially if they continue to stay away from the reach of the Turkish government, would have better conditions to meet their needs and even take advantage of the intense situation to radicalize Turkey and foster the resulted instabilities.
Some political circles in Turkey believe that the government, after its likely victory in the election and achieving its goals, will again try to reduce tensions and renegotiate with the Kurds. The only problem is that the current tense and bloody conditions may not be managed or controlled the way the Turkish government intends. The Turkish government's approach towards Syria and the Kurds in this country could foster the instability in Syria, and even it can intensify the internal conflicts and create new challenges associated with the political stability and security of this country.
