Alwaght- Amid the increasing Israeli attacks on Gaza and violation of the ceasefire, the guarantors of the Sharm El-Sheikh deal decided to hold a meeting to discuss the situation in the Palestinian enclave to keep the agreement going.
In this connection, on December 16, Qatar hosted a meeting, with the central plan was to work out an operational program for the so-called international “stabilization forces” as an important part of the Sharm El-Sheikh agreement.
According to reports, the meeting was convened at the request and under the direct management of US Central Command (CENTCOM). Its core purpose is to translate a political decision and framework into an executable, operational plan capable of making the second phase of the ceasefire a reality.
Washington has decided to bring the Gaza issue and the Israeli occupation to a conclusion by whatever means necessary and, under its new National Security Strategy, gradually shift its focus away from the region. US officials understand that without a comprehensive security mechanism, a durable ceasefire is unattainable and that war would inevitably reignite. This is where a holistic framework becomes critical.
At the Doha meeting, the US is focusing on the command structure; force size and composition; rules of engagement; deployment modalities; training and funding; and the nature of international authorization. The legal foundation is UN Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted on November 17, 2025, which authorizes the creation of a temporary multinational force and a peace mission, calls for a unified and acceptable command for the mission, empowers it to take “all necessary measures,” and defines the stabilization force’s role in securing the environment and advancing demilitarization. At the same time, the resolution ties the phased withdrawal of Israeli forces to demilitarization benchmarks and stipulates that the design and implementation of the arrangements must be carried out in close consultation with Egypt and Israeli occupation.
It is clear that these arrangements will ultimately weaken Hamas. For now, however, Hamas appears intent on influencing the process through a range of means.
Hamas’s top priority for the second phase of ceasefire is full withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces from Gaza and halt of the attacks. The resistance movement’s understanding from the past agreements is that if the new mechanism allows Israel’s military presence to continue or to launch targeted attacks under the truce, the agreement will be meaningless in terms of security. This concern is growing with reports of tensions and clashes on the eve of the second phase and so in Hamas’s view, the sustainability of the ceasefire is contingent on Israeli field conduct and the power of the mediators to rein in Tel Aviv.
On the other hand, one of the program’s key objectives can be considered the disarmament of Hamas and this is where the second major concern arises. Hamas has repeatedly stressed this red line: it will not accept disarmament in the absence of a credible political horizon and clear guarantees, and it fundamentally opposes turning the stabilization force into an instrument of disarmament.
At this very point, an operational contradiction emerges, one that the Doha meeting also faced. On one side, the text of UN Resolution 2803 ties the stabilization force’s mission to demilitarization and decommissioning the weapons of armed groups. On the other side, the narrative from US officials has been that the international mission is not intended to fight Hamas; at best, it will work alongside “trained and vetted” Palestinian police to help stabilize security and support the demilitarization process. For the parties involved, this translates into a multi-layered pressure point: If the force does not actually engage Hamas, how does demilitarization happen? And if the rules of engagement shift toward the use of force, the force effectively abandons its neutrality and becomes a hostile actor, potentially undermining its public legitimacy and its very ability to deploy.
This ambiguity over the rules of engagement and the degree of authority to use force is reflected both in legal analyses and in the hesitations of potential contributing countries.
Another Hamas concern is the presence of the international forces and the issue of administration of Gaza. Media reports citing Hamas and Islamic Jihad officials, say that if the international forces are to play a role, it should be limited to the borders and oversight, not to change into a vast monitoring mechanism inside Gaza.
In contrast, the operational plans described by American officials involve an initial deployment of the stabilization force within areas of Gaza controlled by the Israeli regime, followed by a phased advance alongside the regime’s gradual withdrawal.
From Hamas’s perspective, such a scenario carries two major implications. First, the presence of an international force could effectively legitimize the continuation of the occupation and the territorial division of the land. Beginning operations in regime-controlled areas and tying the Israeli withdrawal to security conditions could render that withdrawal indefinite and subject to delay. Second, if the future administration of Gaza takes shape within a framework that excludes Hamas from security decision-making, it would mean transferring real control to external parties, even if it is packaged as a peacekeeping mission or transitional management.
Of course, the issue of the international force deployment is also a primary concern for Netanyahu’s cabinet. The Israelis are intensely sensitive about who makes up the force. Their fear centers on what could be described as a Muslim Brotherhood-aligned axis, with an active role for Qatar and Turkey. The presence of military forces from these countries could pose a serious threat to the regime. However, reality indicates that the US, in various ways, is counting on the involvement of Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt in this plan, a factor that could itself become a major obstacle to continuing the ceasefire process.
Echoes of the regime’s anxieties were visible in the recent Doha meeting from several angles. According to current reports, the discussions were far from smooth, revealing significant divisions among the parties.
The Israeli regime was not present and Turkey was removed from the talks. This issue is important for Hamas and some other regional actors since Ankara is among the finite channels that holds relations with Hamas on the one hand and on the other hand can play a role in political guarantees, and so its elimination from the ceasefire process strengthen interpretations of the mechanism being a biased one.
Finally, recent Doha meeting likely ended with many ambiguities about the issue of participation of countries in the mission and the commitments and duties of the international forces. Reports suggest that the details on the size of the force, its composition, and rules of engagement are still subject to bargaining. Meanwhile, the hesitation of countries, to a large extent, depends on two vital matters that can seriously overshadow the fate of the second phase of ceasefire: first, the possibility of clash with Hamas and second, ambiguity of the mission of the international forces.
