Alwaght- The possibility of participation of Syrian government led by interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa in the Saudi war against Yemen is the fifth experience of Damascus sending forces cross-border in the contemporary history. But what makes this deployment different from the previous ones is not merely the geographic destination of these forces, but the nature of the conflict, political aims, the warring sides, and its relation to Syria's national interests and regional position.
Syria, which at various junctures threw itself into foreign conflicts to defend Palestine, back the Palestinian resistance, shape the balance of power in Lebanon, and join the coalition to liberate Kuwait, now stands on the threshold of a different kind of test, one in which the prospect of economic aid and stabilized ties with Riyadh may, alongside security considerations, weigh on Damascus's military calculations.
Four cross-border war experiences of Syria
A look at Syria's contemporary history tells us that its cross-border military presence has always been a function of a set of political, security, and geopolitical reservations. First key record is 1948, during the Arab-Israeli war, when the Syrian army shoulder to shoulder with other Arab armies fought against Israeli regime's foundation on the Palestinian land. This involvement was driven by an Arab unity discourse and for defense of Palestine, something that in next decades made up one of the leading factors of the regional and political identity of Syria. In 1967 and 1973 wars, Damascus directly joined anti-Israeli occupation wars, though these wars should be sigled out of the cross-border military interventions in question.
The second episode traces back to September 1970 and the Jordan crisis, when the Jordanian army's clash with Palestinian resistance factions, known as Black September, prompted Damascus to intervene militarily. Syria sent its armored units across the border into Jordan to shield the Palestinian forces, a move framed as support for the Palestinian resistance and a bid to thwart efforts to crush its military and political presence in Jordan. In the end, lacking air cover from the Syrian air force and facing Jordanian military resistance, the Syrian forces were forced to pull back.
Years later, Yasser Arafat, the late leader of the Palestinian Authority, said of the war: "It was a conspiracy—the one behind it, the one who planned it and bankrolled it, was the CIA."
The third experience was in 1976 and with the entry of the Syrian army to Lebanon with the aim of swaying the power equation among various internal parties. By intervening in Lebanon, Damascus aimed to prevent collapse of political structure and expansion of influence of rivaling sides. Following the Riyadh summit and foundations of Arab deterrence force, the Syrian military presence in Lebanon was formalized.
Still, this long-standing presence should not be reduced simply to a framework of defending Lebanon against the Israeli regime. Over the following years, Syria itself became a central player in Lebanon's political and security equations, using that position to expand its regional influence and preserve leverage against the Israeli regime.
The fourth episode dates to 1991 and Syria's participation in the international coalition to expel Iraq's Baathist army from Kuwait. That decision should be seen as a turning point in Damascus's foreign policy, for Syria, despite shared ideology and a history of regional alliances, lined up alongside a coalition assembled under American leadership.
At this juncture, unlike in earlier experiences, a mix of political and economic incentives weighed on Damascus's decision: ending Syria's regional and international isolation, opening the way to participation in the Madrid peace conference, cementing its influence in Lebanon, and gaining access to Arab and Western financing.
According to data presented in studies on foreign aid to Syria, total Arab and international assistance at that time was estimated at roughly $2 billion to $4 billion, with the Gulf states' share reaching about $1.5 billion. Other estimates put total aid received by Syria between 1991 and 1996 at around $2.5 billion. The aid came in the form of grants, low-interest loans, and debt forgiveness.
One of the most important funding sources for Syrian projects was the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, which by June 1995 had extended Damascus loans worth about 248 million Kuwaiti dinars, roughly equivalent to $855 million, resources used to develop electricity, telecommunications, transportation, industry, and other sectors.
The significance of these aids was so high that some time, Syria was de-isolated economically and political in 1980s. These aids paved the way for reconstruction of part of worn-out infrastructures and creation of production and service capacities. Yet, the 1990s experience also laid bare an important limitation: injecting foreign capital without reforming economic and administrative structures does not necessarily produce lasting economic transformation. Despite the investments made, Syria's economy continued to suffer from weak industrial output, constrained exports, and structural problems in state-owned enterprises.
The 1991 experience thus showed that, for Damascus, foreign military engagement can serve not only security aims but also as a tool for extracting political and economic concessions, a pattern now resurfacing in the prospective Yemen file.
Yemen: Repeating Kuwait experience with fundamental distinctions
Now, roughly three and a half decades after its participation in the war to liberate Kuwait, Syria once again finds itself in a position where a decision on foreign military intervention may come bundled with promises of economic aid and political concessions. However, Damascus's circumstances today differ from 1991 in several respects.
First, al-Sharaa's government is pursuing domestic consolidation and the rebuilding of its military, security, and economic structures at a time when the country, after years of civil war, faces a deep infrastructure crisis, diminished production capacity, poverty, and social instability. Under such conditions, securing financing to run the state apparatus and pay the salaries of military and security forces has become one of Damascus's urgent priorities.
Based on assessments of the new government's economic needs, those needs can be grouped under three headings:
Funding current expenses of government and security and military apparatus
One of Damascus needs is to fund payrolls of the army, security forces, and the forces affiliated with former militias under Tahrir al-Sham. Some assessments suggest that this sector needs annually at least $500 million, not to mention the current government expenses and public sector payrolls.
Need for financial aid and low-interest loans to reconstruct infrastructure
The new government needs substantial financing to rebuild the power grid, transportation, public services, and production facilities. Recent agreements between Saudi Arabia's Development Fund and Syria's Finance Ministry, worth roughly $403 million, fall within this framework, though the sum is modest compared with the scale of Syria's economic devastation and its reconstruction needs.
Need for attracting foreign investment and activating the country's economic capacities
Damascus hopes that improved political and security ties with Arab and Western countries will pave the way for major investors to enter the Syrian market. Yet, political and security uncertainty, weak economic infrastructure, and the absence of a clear outlook on regulatory stability and governance mechanisms remain the main barriers to investor entry.
Meanwhile, the convergence of Damascus's recent financial and military agreements with Riyadh has raised questions about the link between Saudi economic aid and the possibility of Syrian military participation in the Yemen war. Media reports speak of Damascus's agreement and the signing of a security pact, along with a Saudi request to draw on Syria's military capacity.
Arab credit duality and the logic of dependence
The current Yemen war is different from the geopolitical crises Damascus got involved over the past four decades in terms of nature and socio-political backgrounds.
The key question is whether a military involvement by al-Sharaa's government into the war against Yemen, in support of the aggression forces, can confer on Damascus the same credibility and legitimacy that came with participating in the defense of the Palestinian cause and of Arab security against the Israeli regime's expansionism.
That distinction matters both geopolitically and in terms of Arab and Islamic credibility. While support for Palestine and confrontation with the Israeli regime has been one of the mainstays of Syria's regional standing over the past decades, participation in a war against a regional actor that in recent years has been one of the principal pillars of support for the Palestinian cause, and an opponent of the Israeli regime's expansionism in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank, could generate negative perceptions of Damascus's new governance in Arab public opinion and across the Muslim world.
Shift of geopolitical position: From independent actor to a security lackey
One of the most significant potential consequences of Syrian military involvement in the Yemen war is its impact on the country's geopolitical standing.
Despite economic and military constraints, for decades Syria had sought, through its geographic position, its role in the Palestinian and Lebanese conflicts, and its strategic ties with regional actors, to secure a place in West Asian equations beyond its material capabilities. That standing was not merely a product of military power, but it stemmed from Damascus's ability to shape regional dynamics and play a role in the balance among competing powers.
Now, however, the new Syrian government's security and military closeness to Saudi Arabia, and the prospect of its joining a new regional arrangement, could set the country on a different trajectory. Cooperation with Riyadh may yield financial resources in the short term, but it also deepens dependence on Saudi security priorities and reduces this Syrian order to the position of a client and a dependent actor.
Regional influence is strengthened when a country can use its geographic position, military capacity, and foreign relations to advance national goals and preserve independence in decision-making.
Alongside this, the potential security and political costs of involvement in the Yemen war should not be overlooked. Entering a regional conflict could expose Syria to military reaction from actors opposed to such intervention and could even affect the reconstruction process and the consolidation of internal security, especially as Damascus still faces internal security challenges and the issue of the Israeli regime's military presence on parts of its territory.
The difference between these two approaches is the difference between holding an independent role in regional equations and becoming a military and security instrument of other powers.
