Alwaght- The fresh attacks between Afghanistan and Pakistan that expanded to airstrikes and direct clashes of the forces of the two countries once again disclosed the depth of the historical differences and deep-seated distrust between the two neighbors. Despite holding several rounds of talks, the two countries have so far failed to strike a permanent deal to end the border clashes, a failure that keeps the clouds of war and instability on the region.
Though the Taliban and Pakistan in the past had a close and friendly relationship, the political developments of the recent years have pushed the two sides at the each other's throats. The continuation of this situation shows that the gaps and disparity between the two sides are too deep to be bridges by dialogue, and actually they need a generic and comprehensive settlement for sustainable peace and stability between them. This conflict not only sent the Islamabad-Kabul relationship into a highly sensitive stage, but also has caused a transformation of the traditional takes from the strategic depth and balance of power in South Asia.
Significance of Afghanistan and Pakistan in South Asia's geopolitical landscape
Afghanistan and Pakistan, two neighboring nations bound by deep historical, ethnic, and religious ties, hold a pivotal position in South Asia's geopolitical equations. Afghanistan's role as a land bridge connecting Central Asia to South and West Asia, combined with Pakistan's critical function as a gateway to the open seas, has cemented their status as key players in regional affairs. So, Stability, or instability, in Afghanistan directly impacts Pakistan's national security and the regional balance of power. Meanwhile, Islamabad's policies toward Kabul can influence the interests of major global powers, including China, India, Russia, and the US. Ultimately, the type of relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan plays a decisive role not only in regional security and economic fortunes but also in shaping the wider geopolitical order of South Asia.
First part: Rise of Taliban and Pakistan's told from 1990 to 2001
The historical and geographical roots of relations between Pakistan and the Taliban should be sought in the developments of the 1990s, when the Taliban movement emerged in Afghanistan and Pakistan, aiming to form an aligned government in its northern neighbor, provided massive political, financial, and military to this group. Islamabad played a pivotal role in arranging and uniting the ranks of the Taliban through its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Lacking military experience and skills in their early days, the Taliban relied on the ISI. The ISI took charge of building the Taliban's military structure by providing tactical training, weaponry, and logistical support, paving the way for the group's rapid expansion across vast swathes of Afghanistan. Additionally, Islamabad's diplomatic backing and the operations of its intelligence networks boosted the Taliban's domestic and regional standing. This consistent support solidified Pakistan's own influence over Afghan affairs and strengthened its hand in South Asian geopolitics.
This strategy is rooted in Pakistan's long-held "strategic depth" doctrine. Islamabad operates on the conviction that its national security depends on maintaining decisive influence in Afghanistan. Based on this approach, Islamabad tried, through supporting to the Taliban-aligned groups and establishing strategic bonds with Afghanistan governments, to set up a geopolitical shield against India and other rivals and so prevent enemies from possible penetration of its eastern borders.
Afghanistan’s significance in geopolitical competition with India
Historically, India and Pakistan have been locked in a zero-sum game for influence in Afghanistan, with each rival power competing to dominate the country's political landscape to its advantage. This geopolitical rivalry with India has dramatically elevated Afghanistan's importance in Pakistan's strategic calculus. From Islamabad's perspective, Afghanistan is more than a northern neighbor; it is a vital strategic buffer against expanding Indian influence. A friendly or neutral government in Kabul is seen as essential for securing Pakistan's eastern flank and preserving a regional balance of power in its favor. Consequently, for Islamabad, Afghanistan has consistently served as a strategic rear area to counter perceived threats from India. So, Pakistan has always been present in Afghanistan as a friendly, or at least neutral side, in Afghanistan.
For Pakistan, controlling or exerting influence over Afghanistan's political structure is a critical tool for managing security threats emanating from India and containing domestic militant groups. Beyond these security concerns, Afghanistan also represents a crucial economic and transit corridor for Pakistan, providing a gateway to the markets of Central Asia and beyond, an opportunity India has also aggressively pursued in recent years. New Delhi made massive investments in infrastructure and development projects during the previous Afghan government and is now actively seeking to engage with the Taliban. This persistent Indian outreach is viewed as a serious threat to Islamabad's interests.
Pakistan religious schools' role in training Taliban ideologically
The religious schools of Pakistan had an essential role in shaping the Taliban ideologically and intellectually. These religious centers, which operate largely on a foundation of hardline religious and jihadi ideologies, have cultivated a new generation of students. Beyond religious instruction, the curriculum often incorporates political and military indoctrination. Many of the Taliban's current leaders and commanders are graduates of these very schools. This shared educational background has forged a deep loyalty to the group's core ideals.
For Islamabad, these madrassas are more than just schools; they are a strategic tool for projecting influence into Afghanistan. By propagating a shared ideology, they ensure the Taliban's continued ideological cohesion and internal unity, directly serving Pakistan's long-term interests.
Providing the Taliban logistically and militarily from Pakistan soil
In the Taliban's formative years, a significant portion of their logistical and military strength flowed directly from Pakistani soil. Islamabad, whether by deliberate design or under the guise of security considerations, provided the essential infrastructure for safe havens and training camps within its tribal regions and border provinces like Waziristan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
These areas became the primary hubs for the Taliban's training, equipping, and support. Within them, robust supply lines emerged to funnel weapons, ammunition, and provisions. The network also provided crucial services, including vehicle repair, medical care, and logistical depots.
Furthermore, a number of religious schools and local networks actively recruited, indoctrinated, and deployed new fighters. This comprehensive support system was instrumental in boosting the Taliban's combat effectiveness and organizational cohesion, ultimately paving the way for their first takeover of Afghanistan.
Taliban-Islamabad relations in first Taliban government from 1996 to 2001
During its first period of rule from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban's relationship with Pakistan reached its peak of cooperation and alignment. Islamabad viewed the Taliban as a strategic ally in its northern neighbor and provided extensive political, financial, and military support to establish a friendly government.
ISI played a decisive role in strengthening the Taliban's power structure. This collaboration enabled the Taliban to consolidate their control over key areas of Afghanistan and establish a relatively stable central government. In effect, Pakistan was the Taliban's primary foreign patron and a key factor in the group's endurance and expanding influence during this era.
In 1996, following the Taliban's capture of Kabul, Islamabad formalized diplomatic relations and recognized the group as Afghanistan's legitimate government. This move not only signaled Pakistan's overt political support but also marked a pivotal moment in deepening the strategic partnership between the two. The act of recognition paved the way for extensive financial, military, and logistical aid, cementing Islamabad's role in stabilizing the Taliban government.
From an economic viewpoint, Pakistan also played a crucial role in bolstering the Taliban government. By opening border trade routes, facilitating the flow of goods, and providing financial resources and humanitarian aid, Islamabad helped create conditions for the relative stability of the Taliban-controlled economy. These measures not only allowed the Taliban to manage the economic cycle within their territories but also increased the mutual interdependence between the two sides.
As a result, Pakistan managed to expand its political and strategic influence within Afghanistan's power structure and advance its own geopolitical objectives against regional rivals. This economic engagement complemented Islamabad's security and diplomatic policies towards Afghanistan.
Islamabad's challenges and opportunities in interaction with first Taliban government
Pakistan's interaction with the first government of the Taliban led to an array of deep opportunities and challenges. In terms of opportunities, this cooperation allowed Pakistan to realize its strategic depth doctrine in Afghanistan, curb Indian influence on its western borders, and hold further control over transit, border, and trade routes in the region. Also, close ties to the Taliban presented Islamabad with effective political and ideological instrument in Afghanistan and bolstered bonds with regional and aligned groups.
On the other side, this relationship had challenges, including international pressures, economic sanctions, concerns about internal instability in the Taliban government, and increase in the threat of terrorism and insecurity on the shared borders. All these left the Pakistani foreign policy facing complex equations.
Second part: Pakistan-Taliban ties during occupation of Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021
US invasion of Afghanistan and duality of Pakistani policy towards Afghanistan
The US invasion of Afghanistan following 9/11 attacks opened a new chapter in South Asian geopolitical and security equations, putting Pakistan in a complex and multifaceted situation. Once a primary backer of the Taliban, Pakistan faced heavy American pressures to join the US-led Western anti-terrorism coalition. As a result, Islamabad formally cut off its support to the Taliban and provided military bases and logistical lines to the Western forces.
Yet, beneath this public reversal, elements within Pakistan's security establishment, particularly the ISI, maintained a limited but strategic backchannel to key Taliban factions like the Haqqani Network. This double game stemmed from Pakistan's enduring "strategic depth" doctrine, aimed at preserving its influence in Afghanistan to counter rival India. However, this very policy of hedging its bets backfired, plunging Pakistan into a crisis of trust with the US, drawing international condemnation, and ultimately fueling a surge in terrorist threats within its own borders.
Unofficial harboring of the Taliban leaders in Pakistan
With the occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan turned into one of the most important unofficial bases of the Taliban leaders and commanders. In border areas like Waziristanand and Kheyber Pakhtunkhwa security climate was proper fod the Taliban to position, recruit, and organize its operations.
These areas functioned as vital support bases and military coordination centers, providing a direct channel for Taliban leaders to communicate with ISI. This network enabled the Taliban to train their fighters, stockpile weapons and equipment, and plan military operations.
While this unofficial support was officially denied on the global stage, it served a crucial purpose for Islamabad: it preserved Pakistan's strategic influence over Afghan affairs and maintained its leverage over key border crossings and regional geopolitical dynamics.
Taliban, the bargaining chip of Islamabad in regional policy between 2001 and 2021
Between 2001 and 2021, when Afghanistan was under the US occupation, the Taliban turned into an effective instrument helping advance geopolitical goals of Islamabad and its bargaining in the regional and international policy. Maintaining an unofficial relationship with the Taliban and harboring its leaders, Pakistan utilized this group to influence Afghanistan's security and political developments. This relationship allowed Pakistan to curb Indian influence along its western borders while cementing its own leverage within Afghanistan. The Taliban, in turn, became a vehicle for enhancing Pakistan's role as a indispensable mediator in international peace talks, diplomatic summits, and security agreements.
In essence, this dual policy of official diplomatic cooperation and covert influence gave Islamabad a powerful bargaining chip, significantly boosting its strategic standing across South and West Asia. The shrewd strategy enabled Pakistan to publicly collaborate with Washington on counterterrorism while simultaneously leveraging its position to secure substantial economic aid, military hardware, and political concessions from the US.
Actually, by balancing overt cooperation with clandestine influence, Islamabad managed to both deepen its control over Afghan affairs and elevate its stature in regional geopolitics and international forums. This left Washington in a position where it felt compelled to offer ever-greater concessions to secure Pakistan's crucial, if often ambiguous, support for stabilizing Afghanistan.
Pakistan's role in determining the new Kabul developments and curbing Indian influence between 2001 and 2021
During the period of foreign presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan worked to limit Indian influence and maintain its own strategic position. It provided intelligence and logistical support to armed groups and border tribes, while simultaneously seeking to weaken political factions aligned with India. Islamabad also engaged with local governments and leveraged political, cultural, and religious tools to win the support of segments of Afghan society. Through political and diplomatic pressure, it actively sought to curtail Indian-funded projects and investments in sensitive areas, aiming to marginalize New Delhi's role and establish itself as the primary external powerbroker in Kabul. In response, India focused on strengthening its ties with successive Afghan governments through economic aid and development projects. This protracted rivalry between Delhi and Islamabad profoundly shaped Afghanistan's political and security landscape, ultimately cementing Pakistan's influential role in the country's affairs.
Pakistan's role in US-Taliban peace talks
Islamabad played a decisive role in the peace process between Washington and the Taliban. Leveraging the close ties it had cultivated with the group since its inception, Islamabad stepped in as an active mediator in 2018.
Using its influence over key Taliban leaders, particularly the Quetta Council (Shura) and the Haqqani Network, Pakistan pressured them to engage in direct talks with American officials in Doha. It also facilitated the diplomatic process by hosting preliminary meetings on its own soil.
Islamabad's primary objectives were to relieve international pressure, to mend its strained relationship with Washington and secure continued financial and military aid, and to ensure the Taliban had a major stake in Afghanistan's future political order. This logistical and diplomatic backing was instrumental in culminating in the Doha Agreement of February 2020, which paved the way for the final withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan.
Behind-the-scenes trading of guarantees between Pakistan and the US
Behind the public facade of US-Pakistan cooperation during the Taliban peace talks lay a series of unspoken guarantees and backchannel understandings that were crucial to advancing the Doha negotiations.
Pakistan committed to leveraging its influence over the Taliban to compel them to negotiate with the United States. In return, Washington offered assurances that it would ease political and economic pressure on Islamabad. The ISI, coordinating with the foreign ministry, provided the critical logistical and diplomatic backbone for the talks. Concurrently, the US secured a key guarantee from Pakistan: that future Afghan soil would not be used against American and allied interests. This covert collaboration formed the essential foundation for the Doha negotiations and the subsequent agreement on the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021.
Main policy lines of Pakistan in 2020 Doha talks
The main policy lines of Pakistan in Doha talks rested on security, geopolitical, and economic interests of Islamabad.
First, Islamabad tried to stabilize the Taliban as the future legitimate actor of Afghanistan politics to cut Indian influence in its neighbor.
Second, Pakistan emphasized orderly and responsible withdrawal of the US forces to steer clear of sudden instability on its borders.
Third, Pakistani policy-makers tried to give a positive image of their country as a peace mediator to ease international pressure and US sanctions. Pakistan took advantage of Doha process to ensure its strategic interests in Afghanistan and the region, including border security and future economic partnerships.
Third part: US withdrawal and formation of second Taliban government since 2021
Pakistan's preliminary welcome of Taliban's return to power
Following the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the establishment of the Taliban's second government, Islamabad's stance towards the new regime became a complex mix of hope, caution, and apprehension.
In the initial months, Pakistani officials publicly welcomed the developments in Afghanistan, framing the Taliban's victory as the end of a foreign occupation and a potential opportunity for lasting regional peace. Many in Islamabad's policy circles anticipated that the Taliban's return to power would bolster Pakistan's strategic depth, diminish Indian influence in Afghanistan, and ultimately produce a government aligned with Islamabad's core geopolitical interests. Pakistan expected that, given its years of support, the Taliban would reciprocate by forging a friendly relationship and guaranteeing security along their shared border.
Re-rise of Tahreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and security challenge for Islamabad
Despite its initial optimism about the Taliban's return to power, the ensuing developments have unfolded contrary to Pakistan's expectations. A central challenge for Islamabad has been the escalating activities of the terrorist group Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an ideologically-aligned but operationally hostile entity whose goal is to overthrow the Pakistani state and establish a political system similar to the Taliban's in Afghanistan.
Emboldened by the Taliban's success in Kabul, the TTP found renewed motivation for its armed campaign, aiming to replicate the Islamic Emirates model within Pakistan's borders.
TTP militants have used Afghan soil as a launchpad for attacks against Pakistani security forces. While the Taliban government in Kabul has repeatedly denied any connection to the TTP, it has, in practice, refused to take decisive action against the group's leaders and operatives based in Afghanistan, even providing sanctuary to some in border regions. This inaction has become a major source of tension between the two neighbors.
From open support to diplomatic and military pressure
As the Taliban’s hostile posture became clearer, ISI, ax the architect of Islamabad’s Afghanistan policy, began pressing the National Security Council to adopt stronger political and military pressure on the group. At times, Pakistan even carried out limited airstrikes on Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) positions inside Afghanistan. In effect, Pakistan’s new approach to the Taliban is increasingly shaped by the military, with an emphasis on domestic security, counterterrorism, and stabilizing its borderlands.
Border disputes have further inflamed tensions beside security issues. The Taliban have repeatedly clashed with Pakistani forces along the Durand Line and threatened to dismantle Pakistan’s fencing projects. The group has never recognized the Durand Line as an official border, while Pakistan considers it an internationally valid frontier. These standoffs have triggered several limited military engagements and deepened mutual distrust.
Afghan migrants and their deportation from Pakistan has also become a leverage tool for Islamabad, complicating the new phase in relations. After Kabul fell, hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees entered Pakistan, straining the country’s already fragile economic, security, and social landscape. In the years that followed, Islamabad intensified its pressure on the Taliban by tightening regulations and launching mass deportations of illegal Afghan migrants.
Economic, border, and political relations contentious
The economic relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan after 2021 suffered from challenges despite mutual dependence of the two countries. Pakistan is one of the main trade routes of Afghanistan and provides the country's basic goods like food, medicine, and fuel. Border disputes, closure of the border crossings like Torkham, and Spin Buldak, as well as banking limits, have blocked their relations boost. However, both are seeking mutual trade boost and expansion of regional transit for a more stable economic outlook to take shape.
Fourth part: Strategic analysis of Pakistan-Taliban relationship
Decisive geopolitical factors
Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan during the Taliban's second government has been shaped by a complex mix of geopolitical, security, ethnic, and ideological factors.
Islamabad continues to view Afghanistan not merely as a strategic neighbor, but as a crucial sphere for its strategic depth doctrine to counter Indian influence and as a pivotal player in regional trade and energy corridors. However, the period since the Taliban's return has demonstrated that Pakistan's traditional calculations are misaligned with the new regional realities. The relationship between the two countries has consequently shifted from tactical cooperation to one of strategic competition and deep-seated distrust.
Competition with India, control over trade and energy routes
Having in mind that countering Indian influence in Afghanistan has long been a cornerstone of Islamabad's foreign policy, Pakistan had hoped the Taliban's return would erase New Delhi's political and economic footprint, cementing Islamabad's role as the primary external power in Kabul. However, defying these expectations, the Taliban have sought to maintain a degree of independence in their foreign relations, cautiously avoiding total reliance on Pakistan.
The reopening of the Indian embassy in Kabul and the recent visit of by Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to New Delhi in October, which was the first such high-level trip since their return to power, signal a potential thaw. Pakistan, however, perceives this outreach as a direct threat.
This independent stance has caught Pakistan's military and diplomatic establishment off guard, revealing the Taliban's preference for balancing among regional powers. Consequently, some analysts argue that Pakistan's recent military operations against TTP leaders inside Afghanistan were partly a reaction to the Taliban's growing engagement with India.
From a geopolitical and economic standpoint, Pakistan views Afghanistan as a vital potential corridor to Central Asia and a key route for energy projects like the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. Islamabad had expected the Taliban to provide the stability needed to advance these initiatives. Instead, border insecurity, escalating TTP attacks, and the repeated closure of key trade crossings have thwarted these goals. In response, control over major transit and customs routes, particularly at Torkham and Spin Buldak, has become a lever of mutual pressure between the two sides.
Ideological and ethnic aspects
In the ethnic and ideological aspect, the religious and Pashtun bonds between the Taliban and parts of Pakistani society were initially seen as a basis for mutual affinity and support. Islamabad assumed these shared identities would give it leverage to steer and contain the Taliban. But once the Taliban consolidated power in Afghanistan, the calculus changed. Pakistan grew increasingly anxious about a rising transnational Pashtun identity. By reviving the Durand Line dispute as a “historic and unresolved” question, the Taliban elevated it far beyond a simple border disagreement and turned it into a political pressure tool against Pakistan, a shift that has injected another layer of tension into bilateral relations.
The paradox of Pakistan's policy regarding the Taliban
Pakistan's policy towards the Taliban's second government has entered a complex and contradictory phase. Initially, Islamabad assumed the Taliban would once again serve as a vehicle for its geopolitical objectives and for curbing Indian influence in Afghanistan, a nation it views as strategic depth against New Delhi. However, the Taliban's return to power has triggered unforeseen consequences. The group has rapidly become a source of inspiration and support for the TTP, which now threatens Pakistan's internal security and western borders.
As a result, the Pakistani military, once the Taliban's primary patron, now faces a dual challenge: It must attempt to maintain its influence in Kabul while simultaneously containing the security threats emanating from the Taliban. This situation has locked the two sides into a perpetual cycle of cooperation, competition, and tension.
Conclusion
As a conclusion, we can say that Islamabad-Taliban relationship over the past three decades has moved from a strategic one to a one shaped by pessimism and conflict of interests. Initially, Pakistan sought to cement its strategic depth in Afghanistan and contain India through providing diplomatic, intelligence, and military support to the Taliban. But Afghanistan developments that followed the US military withdrawal dominstrsted that Taliban is no longer an instrument of Pakistani policy, rather, it is growing independent with its own specific interests.
Pakistan's failure to contain the TTP, the troublesome border disputes, and Taliban's leaning to Pashtun nationalism have exhausted the bonds with Kabul from within. Today, their relationship has reached a point where necessary cooperation is inextricably tangled with deep-seated distrust, which is a clear reflection of the failure of Pakistan's long-standing strategy to instrumentalize Taliban.
