Alwaght- These days, the US and its allies are pushing hard to disarm Lebanon's Hezbollah in order to ensure security of the Israeli regime from the north. But they should know that this popular resistance movement has gone a long way to reach its position today. Hezbollah, which emerged as a small seedling four decades ago, has now become a robust and deeply rooted tree in Lebanese equations that cannot be easily driven out of the military and political landscape of the country.
Although the Western politicians insist that the arms should be exclusive to the Lebanese army, arming of Hezbollah was not a voluntary and pointless option and a complex of factors pushed this movement to the path of armed struggle against the Israeli regime from the outset.
How Hezbollah's armed struggle evolved
The path of Hezbollah’s armed struggle was the result of a long and twisty process that did not happen overnight, and the first resistance cells in Lebanon were formed from the very beginning of the country’s civil war. This war, which lasted from 1975 to 1990, was not just an armed struggle between political and religious factions, but also led to the practical division of Lebanon into regions, each of which was controlled by different militia groups.
In this critical atmosphere, the Lebanese Shiite community, which mainly resided in the south and suburbs of Beirut, was considered one of the most vulnerable segments of the Lebanese society. Shiite areas were at the forefront of the conflicts and were repeatedly targeted by other armed groups, especially the Israeli-backed Christian Phalanges.
In such condition, the Shiite cleric Imam Musa al-Sadr played a key role in political and social awakening of the Shiite community. He believed that the Shiite community needs to be more organized and powerful to secure its political and social rights and the outcome of this belief was foundation of the Harakat Al-Mahroumeen (Movement of the Oppressed) and then its armed wing Lebanon Resistance Brigades, later Amal Movement. Amal Movement's initial goal was to defend Shiite areas and confront internal aggression, but as time passed and the civil war heightened, this necessity became more serious.
The massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which was carried out under the pretext of confronting the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and progressed to the occupation of Beirut, was a turning point in the founding of Hezbollah. This occupation made the situation in the south more critical than ever, and Shiite villages and cities were not only under enemy fire, but the constant presence of Israeli forces had severely disrupted people's security and daily lives.
Therefore, the young and ideological forces of the Amal Movement, influenced by the ideals of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, concluded that a new force must be formed, fully focused on "armed resistance" against the Israeli occupation. For this reason, these forces, together with clerics and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) forces deployed in the Beqaa Valley, established the initial nucleus of Hezbollah. The mission of these forces was to militarily train, organize, and arm young Shiite groups. The initial weapons that arrived via Syria included AK-47 assault rifles, machine guns, mortars, and later anti-tank missiles made by Russia and China.
Over 1980s and 1990s, Hezbollah's arsenal was expanded. In addition to light weapons, the resistance movement acquired short-range Katyusha rockets, allowing it to respond to the Israeli aggression by attacking northern Israeli settlements.
Hezbollah's successful attacks on Israeli convoys and bases in southern Lebanon, especially with the use of anti-tank missiles and guerrilla warfare tactics, established the group as an effective force. This process ultimately led to the occupation regime's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, but contrary to the expectations of some, Hezbollah's armament process not only did not stop but also accelerated.
After 2000, Hezbollah tried to up its level of deterrence and strengthened its military position by acquiring medium-range missiles and building extensive underground fortifications, and the 33-day war in the summer of 2006 was a clear demonstration of the results of this armament process. During the war, Hezbollah fired more than 4,000 missiles towards the north of the occupied territories, targeted the Sa'ar 5 frigate with a coast-to-sea missile, and was able to resist the occupation army's ground attacks.
After this war, Hezbollah pursued the path of military reinforcement with further determination and became a modern army by producing precision missiles and acquiring drone technology. The goal of this stage of armament was to deter any further attacks by the Israeli regime and to consolidate Hezbollah's position as the main security actor in Lebanon. In addition, weapons became a tool to increase Lebanon's bargaining power in regional negotiations, as was clearly seen in the 2022 border agreement on the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean, which led to the consolidation of the Lebanese's rights to benefit from the region's gas resources, and in last year's war between this movement and the Israeli regime, where the enemy finally agreed to a ceasefire to remain safe from missile and drone attacks and was failed to expand its military occupation in Lebanon like what it did in Syria after fall of President Bashar al-Assad.
Lack of powerful and efficient army in Lebanon
One of the reasons that brought Hezbollah up as an armed force to protect national security against foreign aggression was the lack of a cohesive and efficient army. The Israeli army was not only incapable of defending the country against the Israeli regime, but also was unable to protect security internally. Sectarian disputes, shortage of modern equipment, and influence of political groups in the army have practically reduced the army to a weak and ineffective force.
For southern Lebanon residents, reliance on the army for security was no longer an option. So, Hezbollah not only acted as a force defending against the occupiers, but also held the duty to shield the Shiite-inhabited regions against home militant hostilities.
Although one of the most important terms of the 1989 Taif Agreement was the disarmament of all militia groups and no armed group except the Lebanese army and security forces had the right to possess weapons, the army was too weak to manage a country that had just emerged from a long civil war and that was simultaneously under occupation.
This made the continued arming of Hezbollah register not as a temporary measure but as a permanent necessity in the minds of its leaders and supporters, and even the whole Lebanese public. In such circumstances, if there were no force like Hezbollah, Lebanon would be practically defenseless against the Israeli enemy, and in the absence of a powerful force in Lebanon, Tel Aviv could seize a large part of Lebanese territory, like the occupied Syrian Golan, and annex the occupied territories.
Hezbollah leaders have never had military ambitions and are willing to hand over their weapons if circumstances require, but only when they are sure that Lebanon's security will be guaranteed. Therefore, Ali al-Miqdad, a Hezbollah member of parliament recently said in response to foreign pressure: "Those who talk about disarming the resistance should equip the Lebanese army with missiles and fighter jets so that it can stand up to the aggression of the Israeli enemy, but until this happens, we tell all of them not to play with fire."
Additionally, Hezbollah leaders argue that history has shown that the international community is passive when it comes to the Israeli aggression. Since 1982, the UN resolutions and statements have failed to prevent Israeli air or ground attacks on the Lebanese territories. On the other hand, over the years, due to the Israeli regime's red lines, there has never been a real will on the part of Western governments to arm and equip the Lebanese army in a way that would be capable of building deterrence. Even the deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) failed to protect Lebanese territory from constant Israeli aggression, and these forces have never been an obstacle to the Israeli regime's plans and actions in Lebanon.
These facts convinced Hezbollah that only by relying on domestic power and developing military strength can the territory, people, and national sovereignty of Lebanon be defended, an approach that has remained an integral part of the movement's strategy to date.
In the eyes of resistance leaders, disarming Hezbollah in a situation where external and internal threats still persist would mean abandoning Lebanon to a fate like that of Palestine, where the lack of an effective defense force has paved the way for long-term occupation and domination.
Unlike foreign enemies who consider Hezbollah's weapons a threat to Lebanon's internal security, over the past four decades, Hezbollah has never aimed its weapons at the people, the army, or rival political movements within Lebanon, and has used this military power solely against the Israeli regime and mercenaries affiliated with Tel Aviv who sought to destabilize the country.
Now, a majority of the Lebanese, just unlike their leaders who are moving to disarm Hezbollah in line with the demands of the Western-Israeli-Arab axis, see these arms as a guarantor of deterrence against Israeli threats. Victory of Hezbollah and Amal-affiliated figures in elections of recent years suggests that Hezbollah still holds its strong social base and its role in defense of the country goes beyond daily political equations.
Finally, history of Hezbollah founding and arming tell us that this process was not a sudden decision but a product of years of bitter civil war, foreign occupation, a defense structure weakness, and distrust in protection by the international community against Israeli violations. Therefore, without a fundamental settlement of structural weakness of the Lebanese army and creation of a real mechanism to ensure national security, discussing Hezbollah disarming would remain an endless debate in the country's politics.
