Alwaght- One of the issues that has recently caught attention of the international media and analysts is the Turkey's shift in its regional policies. All of the analyses related to the case have a point in common: a U-turn has taken place in Ankara’s foreign policy. A pragmatic closeness of Turkey to Iran and Russia on the Syrian conflict relates the fact that after decades of the Turks' siding with the West, now they have decided to take a new course of convergence with the East.
Meanwhile, a question presents itself: what has driven such a considerable change in the Turkish regional policy? Has Turkey really come up with the understanding that after years of being in the Western camp and standing ally to the US and Europe it should review its major strategy or is it simply a tactical move aimed at putting strains on the West and NATO to wrest further privileges from them?
These questions can be answered under the condition of seeing them through varying aspects and by raising multiple theories. The present piece tries to analyze the Turkish major policy shake-up by means of raising two theories.
The Turkish shift toward the Tehran-Moscow bloc is strategic and genuine
The first supposition must be that Turkey’s intention to reroute to the East and distance itself from the US-led West is real. The most noticeable support for such a claim is Erdogan’s efforts to Islamize the country and reshape the country’s political system to a centralized one, the same system of governing characteristic of West Asia region. This part of the issue is related to Erdogan’s mental motivations and frame of mind. Justice and Development Party (AKP), Erdogan’s ruling party, since its rise to power in 2002 as an Islamist party has planned a transition from the country’s secularist identity to a religious one. In the current conditions, the leaders of AKP along with Erdogan consider the region’s chaotic circumstances as the best opportunity for changes in the constitution and the Turkey’s political system. Therefore, the present regional strategy shift of Ankara can be seen as a product of the real strategic and mental changes of the Islamist leaders.
Another reason that supports reality of Turkey’s goals and motivations behind the shift toward Russia and Iran is related to Kurdish cause in the region. Since 2011, Ankara put forward the plan to establish a no-fly zone in northern Syria in a bid to curb Syrian Kurds'– or the PKK's, to be precise– gain of strength in the region. As part of the plan, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey first set heart on the Western backing but in practice he was faced with promise breaches and US support for the Kurdish forces under the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). As the Kurds advanced in northern Syrian territories and expanded their self-governing system in the form of a bloc comprised of the three cantons of Kobani, Afrin, and the Island, and also PKK's dragging of the clashes with the Turkish army into the Turkish cites, Erdogan quitted optimism to help from the West.
The Kurdish power gain and threats against Turkey are so significant in the Turkish foreign policy that Erdogan went under a transformation in decisions on major strategies. Consequently, Ankara observed that the ways to confront the Kurds lied not in alliance with the West but in proximity to the East, particularly Russia and Iran. Finally, the Turkish leader made up his mind about getting close to Tehran and Moscow. This is quite noticeable in his participation in the December 30 Syria ceasefire.
Turkey's heading to Tehran-Moscow alliance is simply tactical and ostensible
The first theory is faced by another one, just opposite to it. Accordingly, the proximity of Ankara to the East bloc– or the Axis of Resistance in other words– in West Asia and Syria’s crisis is a simple tactic meant to press the Western countries, particularly the US, for concessions. To back this supposition, we can say that due to several-decade alliance with the West since 1924 up to now, Turkey cannot move away from its Western nature. The Turkish economic and social structures are so interwoven with their Western likes that make it almost impossible for Ankara to integrate with the East.
In fact, at a time when Turkey has become disappointed with Washington’s support for its policies due to some of President Obama’s uncertain policies, Erdogan has made some weird, but smart, moves. Actually, being aware of the US diplomatic institutions' hesitation, Erdogan, in the closing days of Obama’s term in office and inauguration of presidency of Donald Trump, decided to actualize his goal from two dimensions in the region, and especially in Syria case. On the one hand Turkey shows off as an actor with observable power in Syria so that Trump after his official start at the White House deals with a Turkey with tangible sway on the ground in Syria. On the other hand, by showing a tendency to boost ties with Moscow and Tehran, Erdogan sends a signal to
Moreover, in recent days, Erdogan’s talks about the Turkish economic growth until 2023 could confirm the fact that the Turks' aim of moving close to the East is a temporary tactic not a permanent strategy. Erdogan in his speech said that he eyed to press up the annual national budget to exceed $1 trillion until 2023. This apparently requires higher levels of economic ties with the West and attracting more Western investment. All these urge continued good relations with the US and the European states. Thereby, closeness to Tehran and Moscow is a tactful measure by Ankara to press the West and specifically the incoming US president Donald Trump.
As a final comment on the two theories, or scenarios, it can be noted that to see whether the Turkish redirection to the East is strategic or is simply a tactic to get further concessions from the West, we should leave it to the course of history of Erdogan’s presidency. The history later will allow us to decide what goals Erdogan, a man dreaming of reviving Ottoman Empire, had in mind behind his decisions. In fact, his approaches are so inconsistent and abrupt that they withhold from us any possibility to make a certain prediction.
