Alwaght- In recent days, after the fall of Al-Fashir in Sudan's Darfur region to the Rapid Response Forces (RSF), a big change has happened in the war equations of the North African country, tipping the scales in favor of the RSF.
The development, which saw mass killing of the civilians, not only crushed the last stronghold of the Sudanese army in west of the country, but also paved the way for rebel advances in central parts. To discuss this game-changing development and its implications on the future of Sudan, Alwaght has talked to Ahmad Alizadeh, an African affairs expert.
Alwaght: How did RSF forces take control of Al-Fashir?
Alizadeh: First, I should mention the course of the developments in the Sudan war. The conflict between the army forces and the Rapid Support Forces began before the Gaza war, specifically on April 15, 2023, and has continued until today. Despite the RSF's victories early in the war and their control over the capital and many of Sudan's major cities, the Sudanese army forces managed to recapture the capital on March 26, 2024, and from September 2024 to October 2025, they advanced and liberated the cities of Al-Jazirah, Omdurman, Sennar, Al-Fashir, and others one after another, pushing the Rapid Support Forces forces back. During this time, army forces in several cities, including Kadugli and El Daein (in South Kordofan state), El Obeid (the capital of North Kordofan state), and Al-Fashir (in North Darfur), were besieged by the rebel forces who are led by General Hemetti until the city of Al-Fashir fell after an 18-month siege, and the RSF forces were able to enter the city on October 27. Consequently, the puzzle of controlling all the states of Darfur was completed. These forces committed a massacre of 2,000 civilians and innocent people in the city. The developments in this country have now reached a stage where should be assessed every moment.
The Rapid Support Forces have been relying on the foreign support for their campaign. On the other hand, the interfering countries have been betting on fall of Al-Fashir and they, relying on the mercenaries, arms, and drones, paid a high price for this goal. In addition, the popular and army forces were under siege in Al-Fashir for over 500 days, devoid of food and medicine, something having cut their ability to resist the Rapid Support Forces' attacks. During this time, the joint forces foiled over 267 attacks on the city by the opposite side.
The rebel forces are receiving arms and equipment including advanced weapons like drones through Libya, South Sudan, and Chad. On the opposite side, the army could not provide ground support to its forces that have been under siege and only was able to back them through air, which was lost recently as the rebels acquired anti-aircraft weapons.
Alwaght: What is the RSF's aim behind controlling Al-Fashir? Why were these forces and their backers were resolved to seize the city?
Alizadeh: Since the conflict erupted between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces, Al-Fashir has witnessed intense attacks leading to widespread destruction and mass displacement of its residents. The importance of controlling this city for the warring parties can be divided into four key reasons:
Historically, Al-Fashir was the capital of the Sultanate of Darfur until the 19th century. After the region's incorporation into Sudan in 1916, it became a major administrative and military center.
2. Al-Fashir's international airport is crucial for air supply and humanitarian operations. Since 2003, the city has been an epicenter of conflict and holds immense military importance in the current war. It was the army's last stronghold in the Darfur region, hosting the 6th Infantry Division. After a year-and-a-half-long siege, the Rapid Support Forces managed to seize control of the city. Reports indicate the death of the commander of the 6th Division among others. The fall of the city meant the rebels gained control over the entire Darfur region, paving the way for their forces to advance towards Kordofan.
3. Al-Fashir is located approximately 800 kilometers west of Khartoum. Due to its geographic location, it connects Sudan to Libya, Chad, and the Central African Republic. It can be said that the city is the political, military, and economic center of gravity in western Sudan.
4. Al-Fashir, with an area of 802 square kilometers, is home to a quarter of Darfur's approximately 6 million-strong population (roughly 1.5 million people).
In addition to historical and geographical significance, Al-Fashir is somehow the economic capital of Darfur. The biggest livestock markets, grains, and gold are located in this city. The city is the concentration center for gold mined from Jabal Amer and Saraf Omar.
The Governor of the Darfur region, Suliman Arcua Minnawi, stated that the primary motivation for the Rapid Support Forces entering the city of Al-Fashir was ethnic, not political. Faisal Mohamed Saleh, the former minister of information, had told Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper back in November 2023 that the advance of Hemedti's forces into North Darfur State could lead to the targeting of the "Zaghawa" ethnicity.
Alwaght: How do you assess the latest military and field developments after fall of Al-Fashir?
Alizadeh: The seizure of Al-Fashir will allow the Rapid Support Forces to move freely and with full security to the Kordofan region, something slated to complicate the operations for the army, especially that the opposite side has full control of West Kordofan. In South Kordofan, the Sudan People's Liberation Army, the ally of the Rapid Support Forces, controls several regions and has already put under its blockade a number of other regions.
In North Kordofan, hours after the Rapid Support Forces gained control of Al-Fashir, they began their attacks eastward and infiltrated several villages near El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan. This further intensifies the siege of the city and complicates any efforts by the Sudanese Armed Forces to advance beyond it. If the RSF succeeds in expanding its control in North Kordofan, direct threats will extend to the White Nile state and Omdurman. The Rapid Support Forces are trying to cut the main roads leading to El Obeid to tighten the siege.
Following the fall of El Fasher, the RSF captured the strategic city of Bara (in North Kordofan), located 40 kilometers north of El Obeid. Operations have expanded to the "Um Dam Haj Ahmed" and "Al-Zureiba" areas, and these forces have initiated clashes with the aim of besieging El Obeid from all sides, attempting to capture the cities of Al-Rahad and Um Rawaba.
El Obeid is a key military and logistical hub for the Sudanese Army and a launchpad for its operations in northern and western Kordofan. The fall of El Obeid, a city located nearly 600 kilometers from Khartoum, would open a path for the RSF towards Omdurman, the second-largest city and part of the capital, an objective repeatedly stated by rebel leaders. El Obeid is one of Sudan's most important cities, both economically and strategically. It hosts the largest market for agricultural products and the main trading center for Arabic gum, acting as a crossroads for trade and agriculture. The oil pipeline to Port Sudan also passes through it. The UN mission has used it as a logistical base, and it is known as the "Bride of the Sands."
The general staff of the Sudan's Armed Forces has sent a group of commanders to the central operations command in El Obeid, signaling a shift in the war map. The army still controls the capital Khartoum and three cities making it, as well as the Northern State, Nile River, Al-Jazira, White Nile, Sennar, and Blue Nile. In South Kordofan, the 22th Infanry Division is only in control of Babanusa, which has been under siege for over two years and whose popular are totally displaced.
Retired Lieutenant General Bashir Meki al-Bahi, the commander of the High Committee for Popular Mobilization and Resistance in Sudan, issued a statement following Al-Fashir fall. In it, he announced a general mobilization and the readiness of the Sudanese people, as well as the opening of training camps to meet the needs of the armed forces for carrying out their combat operations. The committee also declared that the mobilization of fighters continues on all battlefronts. At this stage, he says, the priority is those mobilized to liberate the states of Kordofan and Darfur and to secure the Northern State.
Alwaght: What would be the consequences of Al-Fashir fall for Sudan and the army? Where do you think the developments are heading?
Alizadeh: Following the fall of El Fasher, we can say that the army has lost its last stronghold in the west of the country, and Darfur has turned into an autonomous region for the Rapid Support Forces. A new balance of power has now emerged on the ground between the army and the Rapid Support Forces. If the war does not stop, there is a possibility of further Rapid Support Forces attacks beyond Darfur. Moreover, the rebels’ control of the city could strengthen the so-called parallel government that the Rapid Support Forces have recently established, choosing this region as their headquarters. As a result, their negotiating position could be reinforced. Undoubtedly, this development has weakened the authority of the central government and made the threat of the country’s fragmentation more serious. If this scenario comes true, Sudan would be divided between the Rapid Support Forces based in western Sudan and the government based in Port Sudan in the east, similar to the Libyan model, eventually paving the way for gradual secession like that of South Sudan.
After the fall of Al-Fashir, Turkey’s and Egypt’s roles in supporting the recovery of the Sudanese army’s strength will likely grow. Cairo has reinforced its military presence in the south along the border with Sudan and increased its logistical support. On the other hand, the UAE, which supports the Rapid Support Forces, is increasing the supply of functional weapons to the Darfur rebels through Libya and Chad.
In the shadow of international developments, the wars in Russia and Ukraine, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, the Sudan conflict has become a forgotten war. But after the recent genocide in Al-Fashir, regional and international condemnations against the Rapid Support Forces have intensified. Even US senators have called for the RSF to be designated as a terrorist organization and, in a rare move, criticized the UAE for its interference in Sudan’s affairs. The US representative to the UN also condemned the Rapid Support Forces and its allies in Sudan for committing racial genocide and called for sanctions and an updated sanctions list. The European Union, too, has condemned the rebels' ethnic violence in Sudan.
Amid the growing international pressure to end the war in Sudan, the country's Security and Defense Council led by Abdul Fattah al-Burhan held a meeting to discuss the US-proposed plan for humanitarian truce. Simultaneously, TV r government in Khartoum is consulting with its regional partners about the details of this suggestion with the aim of halting the clashes and starting a political process.
Alwaght: Foreign support helped the RSF to seize Al-Fashir. Can you have your say on this?
Alizadeh: Foreign intervention and involvement in prolonging and intensifying the conflict are among Sudan’s current major challenges. Foreign countries, especially the UAE, have shifted the balance of power in favor of the Rapid Support Forces by transferring foreign mercenaries and sending modern weapons and drones.
Mohamed Siraj, Sudan’s ambassador to Russia, stated regarding the recent escalation of fighting in Darfur that the Rapid Support Forces are using foreign mercenaries (Colombian and Ukrainian) to strengthen their positions. According to the Sudanese ambassador, about 400 former Colombian soldiers were recruited through an Emirati company in Colombia and sent to Sudan via the UAE and Libya. They have been integrated into the “Desert Wolves” battalion under the command of the rebels.
According to the Colombian government, these individuals were deceived. They had been promised work protecting oil facilities in the UAE, not military operations in Sudan. Ukraine, too, has reportedly sent special forces to fight alongside the Rapid Support Forces.
Somalia’s Federal Minister of Defense, Ahmed Moalim Fiqi, recently confirmed that mercenaries are being continuously transferred to Sudan through the airport of Bosaso city in Puntland, Somalia. From there, they are flown to Chad and Niger, and eventually reach western Sudan to join the rebels.
One of the reasons perpetuating the instability in Sudan is that a majority of its states share borders with other countries. Sudan’s border regions are directly connected to foreign frontiers, and only the central areas lack such borders. In other words, except for Al-Jazirah, Khartoum, and North Kordofan, all other Sudanese states share borders with neighboring countries. Sudan borders seven countries: Egypt to the north, Libya to the northwest, Chad to the west, the Central African Republic to the southwest, South Sudan to the south, Ethiopia to the southeast, and Eritrea to the east. Egypt supports the army in the conflict between the two generals because of long-standing ties between Egyptian and Sudanese intelligence services, as well as between the two countries’ militaries. Moreover, competition has emerged between Egypt and Ethiopia, especially after the fall of Omar al-Bashir. Ethiopia supports the Rapid Support Forces. When Egypt sometimes shows restraint or steps back, it is mainly due to pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Egypt has always been skeptical about a peaceful revolution in Sudan and the prospect of a civilian government there. Cairo prefers a form of governance in Sudan that mirrors its own, a military-led rule with a democratic facade.
Aiming to strengthen its regional role, Ethiopia has consistently sought to take advantage of Sudan’s turmoil. Addis Ababa aligned itself with the forces of freedom and change during the unstable period that followed al-Bashir’s fall. At that time, disagreements emerged between civilian and military factions over how to govern the country. Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed, serving as the rotating chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), used his position to engage with Sudanese parties in an effort to bridge their differences. Ethiopia’s stance toward Sudan’s current crisis reflects its broader behavior toward the country since al-Bashir’s overthrow. Although the Ethiopian government has shown open interest in a victory by the Rapid Support Forces , it has failed to provide any tangible support to Hemeti’s troops.
Multiple visible and hidden actors are influencing Sudan’s internal developments, with the UAE at the forefront of those intervening and shaping events. Following the atrocities in Al-Fashir, Mohammed bin Zayed’s support for General Hemeti and the RSF has become clear to both the Sudanese people and the world. Abu Dhabi’s role in financing and backing mercenaries in countries such as Libya and Yemen is already well known. This small Persian Gulf state wields influence far beyond its size and relies heavily on mercenary forces.
Reports indicate that Emirati aircraft have transported shipments of weapons and ammunition to Um Jaras Airport in eastern Chad. These arms and munitions, flown in by UAE planes, are then moved across the border into the Darfur region. Chad has reportedly allocated two airports, Um Jaras and Abeche for flights arriving from the UAE carrying weapons and military supplies intended for the rebel militias.
Alwaght: As you said, one of the most effective actors in Sudan is the UAE. What is mainly driving Abu Dhabi’s interference?
Alizadeh: Due to its position in the Red Sea area, Sudan is of great importance to the Persian Gulf Arab monarchies. The UAE has major economic and food interests in Sudan, and these interests grow more important with the climate change challenges intensifying.
Media outlets suggest that Abu Dhabi’s intervention in Sudan is driven by the smuggling of gold and other Sudanese resources, but the country’s primary goal is to counter political Islam. Abu Dhabi has long feared the rise of Islamist movements in Sudan and has taken steps to eliminate their influence. For instance, in 2019, the Emirates played a key role in paving the way for the overthrow of Sudan’s former president, Omar al-Bashir. After al-Bashir's ouster, Abu Dhabi rushed to cozy up to the transitional administration and shifted its foreign policy in a way to fit its interests. And now the Rapid Support Forces are active in Sudan under the banner of fighting the Islamists and for forming a secular civilian government in the country.
