Alwaght- The massive Israeli aggression on Gaza and Lebanon over the past year and recently on Syria shows that the Israeli leaders have evil plans for West Asia region and find the chaos in Syria the best opportunity to realize a long-chased dream.
Cairo-based Al-Habtoor Research Center in a detailed report has explained behind-the-scenes goals of Israeli warmongering in the region that matches the plan the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu unveiled in his UN General Assembly speech.
According to this plan, the Greater Israel dream is not imaginary but real. First unveiled by Israel founder Theodor Herzl, the plan includes all territories from Nile in Egypt to Euphrates in Iraq.
The plan includes lands from Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, all of Jordan and Palestine. In 2017, the United Nations published a report showing that the Israeli regime continues to annex the West Bank and keeps the Palestinians in severe conditions of isolation and deprivation.
In addition, during the military operation in Gaza, the soldiers of the Israeli army had Greater Israel badge on their uniforms, indicating that the regime may expand its operations in the Middle East after the end of the military operation in Gaza.
The path to realizing the dream of a Greater Israel began in December 2024, after the Israeli army entered the occupied Syrian Golan Heights. In this area, Israel launched construction work and a road along the border with Syria.
If the Israeli regime’s construction project in Syria is the first step towards building a corridor that connects the occupied territories to the Euphrates, it will bring Tel Aviv closer to its dream of a Greater Israel.
The question arises here: What will be the consequences if Israel succeeds in creating this corridor? Below, we will describe this ambitious Israeli corridor to clarify what dream Tel Aviv’s leaders have been chasing for eight decades.
What is the proposed corridor?
The proposed Israeli corridor would be a passage that starts in the Golan Heights and reaches the Euphrates through Syria, where the Kurds, with US support, control all areas east of the Euphrates, including the entire Syrian-Iraqi border. Although it is unclear exactly where the Israeli regime will construct this corridor, Turkish media have published reports indicating that the proposed corridor will be created in southern Syria and near the Jordanian border, allowing Tel Aviv to control the Jordanian border.
If the project is realized, it would enable the Israeli regime to control large areas up to the Iraqi border. In addition, the construction of the corridor near the Jordanian border is due to security concerns, as this strategic location allows Israel to focus on countering security challenges that may arise from Syria.
Potential benefits of the corridor for Israel
Firstly, this corridor will make all in the occupied territories believe in creation of the Greater Israel. Therefore, it will mobilize all the settlers for future wars and justify the higher spending on military rather than on education and health.
Secondly, the corridor will allow Tel Aviv to annex new territories and pose security threats to Syria and Iraq. Since its establishment in 1948, the Israeli regime has adopted an expansionist military strategy that includes annexing new territories and trying to transfer the war to Arab lands. This strategy led to the occupation of Gaza, the West Bank, the Sinai Desert, and the Golan Heights in 1967.
The main goal of this strategy is to transfer the war into the territory of Arab countries and force them to prioritize the liberation of their territories. An offensive war against the Israeli regime reinforces the strategy of creating a new corridor, since Syria will be the arena of any future confrontation between Israeli and Syrian forces. In addition, reaching the borders of Iraq allows Tel Aviv to conduct military operations or airstrikes against Shiite groups, such as the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
Third, the creation of this corridor could bring economic benefits to Israel, if the regime can strengthen its presence in Syria, it can export Israeli goods to eastern Syria, where the Kurds are present, and in return import oil and gas from this region. It is expected that Israel will use this move as an intermediary to export oil and gas from Kurdish-controlled areas to Europe through a new pipeline that will run from the occupied territories to Cyprus and Greece and end in Europe. However, the project will face many security challenges from Turkey, which has tensions with Greece and Cyprus over maritime demarcation and refuses to export any oil and gas from the disputed areas in the Mediterranean Sea.
Fourth, the new corridor allows the Israeli regime to pose political and military challenges to Turkey. In November 2024, the newly appointed Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar stated that Tel Aviv should strengthen its relations with minorities in the Middle East and North Africa, including the Kurds, who have been described as Israel’s natural allies. Tel Aviv believes that strengthening relations with the Kurds in Syria will lead to a further deterioration of relations with Turkey. However, Israel may be ideologically inclined to continue the project after applying a cost-benefit approach showing that the benefits of the project outweigh its costs in the long run. In addition, the project will politically insulate the Israeli regime from external military challenges from neighboring countries by providing leverage to use minorities in Syria, such as the Druze and Kurds, as proxies for Tel Aviv.
Expected consequences for regional security
If Israel succeeds in establishing a new corridor in Syria, it will bring obvious consequences to the regional policy. First, this corridor may lead to a massive war between Syria and Israel, because many of the armed groups active in Syria have the religious, nationalist, or both, motivations to fight Israeli occupation.
Second, the creation of a new corridor would allow for greater Israeli support for Kurdish armed groups, which could pave the way for the creation of a Kurdish state, thereby increasing the potential for partition of Syria, which would result in Russia deploying military forces in the Mediterranean. However, Turkey and Iran have repeatedly expressed their commitment to the unity of Syria and have a common interest in preventing the establishment of an independent Kurdistan.
As a result, Turkey and Iran are expected to coordinate their actions against the new corridor. If Turkey manages to coordinate with Russia, it may be able to launch a large-scale military operation against Kurdish armed groups. This will only happen if the US withdraws its forces from Syria. The Turkish military operation will be accompanied by a military blockade, which may be limited in its effectiveness. To ensure that new weapons do not enter eastern Syria, Turkey will have to coordinate with the Iraqi government to deploy its forces on the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan and eastern Syria. Despite these efforts, the Kurds could receive weapons from Tel Aviv through the new corridor. As a result, a military confrontation between Turkey and Israel in Syria may occur because Turkey may resort to striking the route of Israeli military supplies to the Kurds.
Obstacles ahead of proposed corridor
Despite its benefits, the corridor may bear challenges triggered by a variety of factors. First, since it is a long route, Israel may need to set up several military posts to control it. Deploying forces along the road without air defenses could make Israeli forces an easy target for Syrian forces and other Shiite militias in Iraq. Deploying air defenses is costly and does not ensure 100 percent protection for Israeli forces. Consequently, establishing this corridor would require continued and intensified military operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon to prevent the Lebanese movement from attacking Israeli forces in Syria.
Second, the creation of the corridor requires strong financing and may cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Since the Israeli economy is at its nadir in recent years due to the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, it may not be able to afford such costs at the moment, which would include not only creating the corridor itself, but also the establishing military bases and posts, integrating advanced surveillance and defense systems, and ensuring the protection and maintenance of the route at a high level of security.
These elements, along with potential logistical support and border security, would increase the cost of the project beyond building a simple transportation route. To eliminate this challenge, Tel Aviv may try to develop the corridor economically in order to gain financial support from Western powers. These measures include selling ideas about ensuring support for the Kurds in the event of a full withdrawal of American forces from Syria, limiting Iranian influence in Syria, and limiting arms smuggling from Syrian soil to Hezbollah. In addition, Israel may use Europe’s need for new energy sources to convince them to throw their weight behind the corridor, which could transport oil and gas from Kurdish-controlled areas through the occupied territories to Europe.
Third, Syrian armed groups pose another challenge to Israel’s efforts to create the corridor. If Tel Aviv starts building a new corridor, the new Syrian political system may be pressured to respond militarily, which would be the first step, and Turkey may also support the Syrians in attacks on Israeli forces, as Turkey views any Israeli attempt to provide continued support to the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces as a threat to its national security.
In October 2024, Erdogan said that Israel might attack Turkey after Gaza and Lebanon. Although it was not clear what he meant, he was probably referring to Israel’s possible support for Kurdish militias operating in Syria.
Fourth, Russia’s presence in Syria may be another obstacle to the creation of this corridor even after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government. Russia has repeatedly stated its support for the unity of Syria and has also not allowed Turkey to conduct a limited military operation against the Kurds. So, Moscow is expected to stand against a corridor threatening its Syria influence.
Finally, a new corridor linking Golan Heights to eastern Syria can tip the scales of power in the region since it allows Israel to expand its foothold to Iraqi borders. But this will also bring to the ring the regional powers. A constant conflict will bring the Israeli project face to face with military, financial, and regional obstacles. In other words, this project can trigger direct confrontation of actors having forces on Syria ground, especially Turkey and the Kurds.
