Alwaght- Though the mutiny of the Wagner PMC (private military company) led by Yevgeny Prigozhin winded down with President Vladimir Putin's adroitness in less than 24 hours, it raised many questions about the result of war in Ukraine and its consequences on the traditional sphere of Moscow influence in West Asia and Africa.
Prigozhin’s exile to Belarus and possible disbandment of the group after 9 years will have significant consequences to Africa, where Wagner over the past years has expanded its political, economic, and military influence. Since Wagner has been considered Russia's proxy group in Africa and West Asia, the end of its cooperation with the Russian government will itself have an impact on the international arrangements of the Russians, but here is the main question: To what extent will the end of friendship with Wagner impact the Kremlin's regional policies? A look at the Wagner's activities and capabilities in various regions can better help us answer this question?
Africa, the bastion of Wagner activities
The focus of the Wagner group in recent years was on African countries, and Russia has managed to strengthen its foothold in this continent with the help of its proxy.
The group has been active in Libya since 2016 and supported the forces loyal to General Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the Libyan opposition forces in the east of the country. Reportedly up to 1,000 of Wagner's mercenaries were involved in bringing Haftar to power in the official government of Tripoli in 2019, and Russia also supplied Wagner's equipment in the North African country. Therefore Wagner's presence and military expertise is necessary for Haftar's grip on the southern and eastern provinces.
On the other hand, in 2017, the Wagner group was invited to the Central African Republic (CAR) to protect the diamond mines, and the group has substantially assisted the government's push against local rebels.
Wagner is also active in Sudan civil war, and backs the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo. Tens of billions worth of Sudanese gold has reportedly been transferred to the UAE with Wagner's assistance.
Also, Mali’s government invited Wagner forces to defend the country's security against militant groups, and the arrival of this group in 2021 influenced France's decision to withdraw its forces from the country. Wagner has had more or less activities in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso and Venezuela.
Wagner has estimated 5,000 troops stationed across Africa, and companies linked to Prigozhin have signed security and military aid pacts with CAR and Mali governments. There are also reports Russia has used Wagner in these countries to bring them into Russia's orbit.
Given this extent of influence of the group, Wagner's exit will raise serous questions to the African governments that rely on it for their security and can challenge Moscow’s geopolitical influence in this continent. After all, Wagner has enhanced the position of the private armies in terms of accessibility and capabilities and has transformed into a key actor in such conflicts as Syria, Libya, and south of African Sahara.
In Africa, Wagner is synonymous with Russia's geopolitical interests and serves as an instrument in competition with the West. The group functions as an integral part of Russia's military network across Africa.
Wagner's mercenaries have fought side by side with Russian troops in Syria, a bastion of Russia's West Asia influence, even engaging in deadly battles with US special forces and controlling strategic areas including oil and gas fields.
Wagner's withdrawal of 5,000 troops will fuel speculations about a security vacuum in CAR, Libya, Mali and Sudan, and what groups will replace it to further serve the Russian interests in the region.
In recent years, Wagner was regarded as the key Russian actor in the West Asia and Africa as it worked to advance Moscow’s interests in the two regions. The group's activities go beyond security and include wood and mining industries. For African countries facing limitations, Wagner's services are attractive and payments to the group's members often take place using mining and other accessibility privileges.
The main concern is the possible instability caused by the withdrawal of Wagner troops from their current missions. These soldiers have special training and skills that can greatly affect the military capabilities of the countries they support.
In the case of CAR, the withdrawal of Wagner's forces can give armed rebel groups an opportunity to seize more territory and re-destabilize the country. The same scenario applies to other countries where Wagner is active, such as Mali and Burkina Faso. It was for this reason that after Wagner's rebellion, the leaders of Mali and Central Africa talked to Moscow officials to review the possible fallout of ending the cooperation of this group with Moscow.
Russian influence will be maintained to some extent
Despite the fact that Wagner operates as Russia's powerful arm in Africa and its demise can overshadow Moscow’s influence in this continent, this does not destroy the Russian influence at its entirety. A major part of the Wagner arms are provided by the army and it was thanks to these arms that the group made gains on the ground. Therefore, in Wagner's absence, part of Moscow's strategic power will be preserved in Libya, Sudan and other countries, because the mercenaries were attracted to Wagner's body because they knew that they were supported by the powerful Russian army and hopeful about their victories.
According to some experts, despite Wagner isolation, Putin, using proxy forces, will very likely want to preserve the Russian interests abroad which do not require regular army.
In talks with the African allies of Russia, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov tried to assure them that Wagner operations in Africa will go on. Moscow considers Africa one of strategic regions helping advance the plans for its new world order.
Russia sees groups like Wagner as an opportunity to achieve its political and military goals, as the Kremlin's use of mercenaries enables it to recruit private manpower without need for regular army.
That Wagner is now stationed in the allied Belarus means that Russia does not want to lose the group, and Putin himself said that many of Wagner fighters are patriots whose capabilities should be used.
Despite the fact that experts raise possibility of Wagner disbandment, Kremlin will maintain it, indeed under control, for advancing its policy and integrated in the regular army in order for the defense ministry to leave to it the saber-rattling in other regions.
The rejuvenated attacks on terrorist positions in Syria in recent weeks confirm that possible disbanding of Wagner will not considerably affect Russia’s mission in Africa. Syrian officials said that Damascus is pounding terrorists in Idlib in association with the Russian air force without the presence of the Wagner fighters on the Syrian soil. So, in Africa, too, Moscow can act to a large extent, and a part of the activities may be done with the presence of the Russian advisers for training local forces.
Detaining Wagner fighters in Syria in recent days and carrying out drone strikes on their bases in Libya, which are believed to be a work of Moscow as part of a Putin crackdown on the group, indicate that Russia has the necessary capabilities to carry on the game in other regions and dissolution of the Wagner will not very much impact its role in Africa and West Asia, since at a time Russia is involved in a confrontation with NATO in Ukraine, decline of the Kremlin's sway in areas of Wagner presence will damage Russian image while Putin cannot afford to show a weakness.
Since Russia has taken on NATO across the world after starting Ukraine war, it does not quit Africa to the benefit of the Western rivals. Moreover, Moscow leaders see Africa a wrestling ground in confrontation of the West. In recent months, they have signed many economic and military agreements with many African countries. Russia is the biggest arms seller to the African countries and even has overtaken its American rival.
Therefore, there are two scenarios ahead of the future of influence of Russia and Wagner in many countries: Either integrating in the Russian army with special decrees or acting independently under Russian government’s control. Moscow knows that full separation of these forces from Kremlin will curtail Russia's power of influence in Africa.
Another important point is that Prigozhin will not abandon his huge economic interests in Africa. He has made a big fortune over the past years by striking oil, gas, and mining deals with African countries. He knows that without Kremlin support, he and his men can do nothing and a major part of their business in Africa is done thanks the Russian relations with this continent, and if Kremlin leaders quit their backing to Wagner, the Africans will review their policies towards this group.
If after Wagner rebellion the Kremlin leaders show weakness signs, they will leave a degrading effect on Russia's global position. However, Putin's reaction and logical management of the crisis showed that Moscow has by no means lost itself, and its global influence, especially in Africa, will not suffer serious problems in the absence of this paramilitary group.
