Alwaght- On Sunday, the news of a failed coup attempt in Jordan kingdom hit the international media headlines. Media reported arrest of Prince Hamza bin Hussein, the former crown prince and half brother of King Abdullah II of Jordan along with 20 others for "threats to national security and stability."
In a video message, the prince said he was "under house arrest" by the military, and then Jordanian Joint Chief of Staff Major General Youssef Ahmed al-Haniti said in a statement that Prince Hamza "was asked to stop activities and movements targeting the nation's security."
With the publication of the news and considering the history of foreign actors behind the scenes in planning or participating in military coups in Arab and Islamic countries such as Egypt, Sudan, Mali, and Turkey in recent years, the fingers of blame soon were pointed to Saudi, Emirati, and the Israeli regimes that are infamous for their destabilizing actions in the region.
The argument of the supporters of the theory of the Saudi and Emirati involvement in Jordan power grab attempt is built on the arrest of two coup plotters who are known to have close relationship with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
According to the official Jordanian news agency, Petra, the detainees included "Sharif Hassan bin Zaid" and "Bassem Awadullah" who were arrested for "security reasons". Bin Zaid was previously the special envoy of the Jordan’s monarch to Saudi Arabia.
Awadullah, however, was the chief of staff of the royal palace in 2007, and before that the head of the king's office. In recent years, Awadullah has worked as an advisor to the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. He was one of the architects of the privatization process of the Saudi oil giant Aramco. He was also with Prince Mohammed at the January annual investment conference dubbed " Future Investment Initiative", held in Riyadh. After leaving Jordan, Awadullah flew to the UAE, where he founded a company he named El-Tomouh, or ambitions in English, reported Petra news agency. The two detainees have, overall, strong relationship with Saudi Arabia and are widely believed in Jordan to have Saudi citizenship and passports.
The Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper of Israel reported on the events in Jordan on Saturday night, naming the Saudi government and "another" Persian Gulf Arab state behind the attempt. The newspaper continued, citing high-ranking Jordanian sources, Saudi government and other country, whose name was not mentioned in the report, coordinated with each other to carry out the coup in Jordan and were aware of what was happening. The Israeli newspaper assumed the other involved country was the UAE.
The plot promoted some questions: What are the Israeli-Saudi goals? Does it accord with the developments in Jordan to call the plot a coup attempt, as did the Israeli media? Was the alleged coup an operational plot to overthrow King Abdullah II or there was another goal behind the attempt?
Although the Jordanian government is considered an ally of Saudi Arabia and generally has good relations with the Persian Gulf Arab monarchies, some widening gaps in their bilateral relations in recent years cannot be ignored.
In a general sense, the roots of the fundamental differences between Saudi Arabia and Jordan date back to tribal hostilities, at least to the 1920s. At that time, the forces of AbdulAziz Al Saud, known as Ibn Saud, the founder of Saudi Arabia, expelled the Hashemites, who claim to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, from the Hejaz region to become the guardians of the two holy shrines in Mecca and Medina. Although Cold War policies reduced this Saudi-Jordanian animosity and rivalry, they resurfaced in the first Persian Gulf war in 1990-1991, when Jordan under King Hussein built alliance with Ba'athist Iraq. At the time, the Saudis claimed the alliance was aimed at retaking Hejaz from the Al Saud. In this tough period, the Saudis cut off economic aids to Amman.
Recently, this competition renewed in another way to gain legitimacy for the custodianship of another important Muslim holy place, Al-Aqsa Mosque in Al-Quds (Jerusalem). Since the late 1940s, the Hashemites have served as custodians of Muslim holy sites in Al-Quds, including the Al-Aqsa Mosque— the third holiest site in Islam. But rumors have been circulating in the region in recent years that the Saudis are aspiring for the role. This rivalry over holy sites gained further traction especially that King Abdullah II and bin Salman have no close relations.
Jordan is strongly opposed to actions of bin Salman, as well as the Emirati foreign policy head Mohammed bin Zayed , to complicate the Palestinian issue and end the decades-long Arab-Israeli conflict over the Palestinian cause through compromises to Tel Aviv.
The demographic factor plays an important role in Jordanian politics. Palestinians account for a majority of the 6.5 million Jordanian population who fled to Jordan before the Israeli foundation in 1948 and after the Six-day Arab-Israeli War in 1967. This encourages Amman leaders to find the "deal of the century", which is based on rejecting the Palestinian right for return, harmful to their interests. Such an opposition provoked Saudi and Emirati punishments against Amman via cutting off economic aids in anticipation of flexibility to their policies.
As a country grappling with economic crisis, Jordan is heavily dependent on foreign support. Unemployment rate is about 19 percent, with youth unemployment estimated at around 40 percent. The debt-to-GDP ratio is very high, at 94 percent as figures show. In recent years, Jordan has begun austerity measures to meet the conditions for borrowing from the International Monetary Fund, but these policies have led to periodic anti-government protests by various segments of the society, forcing Amman to reduce the subsidies cut slope. In addition, although Jordan has been relatively successful in curbing the spread of COVID-19, the pandemic, along with the closure of jobs, has intensified the kingdom's economic predicament.
This situation has led to Jordan becoming more dependent on the Persian Gulf states. According to 2018 data, an estimated 800,000 Jordanian citizens work abroad, representing more than 11 percent of the total Jordanian population. Most of Jordanian immigrants work in the Persian Gulf Arab countries. 61.3 percent are in Saudi Arabia, 14.1 percent in the UAE, 12.5 percent in Qatar, 6.1 percent in Oman, 3.7 percent in Kuwait, and 2.1 percent are in Bahrain, reports suggest.
This economic dependence naturally entails political costs and limits Jordan's independence from Saudi and UAE policies on regional issues, especially given Saudi Arabia's position in the Arab world. However, even if Jordan cooperates with the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council, it tries to maintain its freedom of maneuvering. In 2017, for example, Amman rejected a request from the Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to ban the Muslim Brotherhood and cut off diplomatic relations with Qatar, which led to Riyadh canceling its economic aid package to the country. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is the most important opposition force inside the parliament and the most powerful and influential political group, with a strong popular support base.
Another Jordan inconsistency with the Saudi policies was when the Saudis launched in March 2015 the "Operation Decisive Strom" against Yemen. Initially, the Saudi rulers succeeded to gather around themselves Sunni Arab countries, including Jordan. But soon Jordan rejected to send ground forces to the campaign and its participation in air operations only lasted a short time.
Although these fissures can explain Saudi-Emirati-Israeli destabilizing plots in Jordan to put strains on the king to join their regional policies, the theory about a military coup remains ungrounded. According to Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safdi, none of the detainees were army staff. The fact that the coup was arranged without involvement of the army chiefs promotes alternative scenarios: It was either a warning to the Jordan leader by the Saudis and Emiratis or a preventive government measure to check any coup plans by figures close to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in the power circle in the middle of the economic crisis and broadening public discontentment with the government.
