Alwaght- In recent months, West Asia and South Caucasus regions have undergone profound changes in geopolitical terms, signaling extensive efforts by some actors to redefine balance of power and networks of cooperation between various sides. One of these important developments was the surprise visit to Baku of the Syrian Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), whose trip triggered waves of analyses and speculations. He was officially received by senior Azerbaijani officials, a event that cannot be simply seen as ceremonial.
During his meetings with Azerbaijani officials, an energy MoU was signed according to which Azerbaijan will export gas to Syria via Turkey in the near future, something expected to improve Syrian energy security. Baku, media said, assured Damascus that it is capable of helping to revive Syrian energy sector.
According to the Middle East Eye, al-Jolani in his meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev tried to persuade him for presence of the Azerbaijani state oil company, SOCAR, in the eastern Syria oil projects.
Since taking power in Syria, al-Sharaa has tried to present a more moderate political image, and this change in approach (in slogans) has taken place within the framework of regional and international pressures and the need for strategic alliances, although in practice, the movement under his leadership continues to follow the ideological practices of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in its past violent treatment of minorities, and its monopoly on political power has not ended.
On the other hand, Azerbaijan, which in recent years has been actively seeking to change the geopolitical situation in the Karabakh region and Central Asia by waging war and instability, is working to enhance its political, economic, and security influence in the region by taking advantage of its strategic geographical location at the intersection of West Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe. Baku’s territorial expansionism and geopolitical ambitions in recent years, which centered on the effort to create the Zangezur Corridor, have pushed the country towards forming an alliance with the Israeli regime, which, for various security, political, and economic reasons, has sought to expand its influence in Central Asia by approaching the Iranian borders.
In these circumstances, al-Sharaa’s visit to Baku includes dimensions beyond bilateral relations, which are also related to Tehran’s security interests.
Al-Sharaa’s visit goes beyond bilateral ties
Though the visit revolved around energy and bilateral ties, it actually follows agenda beyond these. According to a media outlet, this visit is not limited to Baku officials and involves meeting representatives from Israeli regime in Azerbaijan.
The secret talks between Syrian officials and the Israelis are not new, and in recent months, several meetings have been held between officials from both sides in different countries. Earlier, the UAE played a key role in the process of the Syrian interim government’s thaw with Tel Aviv. Now, it seems that this sensitive mission has been entrusted to Baku, which, with its strong ties with Tel Aviv, warm relations with Ankara, and hidden channels with some factions of the Syrian opposition, has become a suitable platform for such talks.
Baku has established close relations and extensive cooperation with the occupation regime in recent years, so that Tel Aviv is one of Baku’s main partners in the fields of technology, military, and energy. This cooperation is manifested in the form of joint military and economic projects, and the two sides pursue mutual interests. As in the second Karabakh war in 2020, Azerbaijan used Israeli-provided drones to target some sites in Armenia.
According to numerous reports, strategic relations with Tel Aviv have expanded not only in the military and intelligence fields, but also in cultural and social contexts. Meanwhile, the Jewish community in Azerbaijan, with the support of Tel Aviv, has gradually acquired a structure similar to the “diaspora” and is playing an active role in deepening Israeli influence. The formation of these social and economic groups is part of Israel’s grand strategy for a permanent presence on the northern borders of Iran and influence in regional relations.
In the current situation, Azerbaijan is not only hosting secret meetings between representatives of the Syrian interim government and Israeli officials, but is also trying to play a mediating role in the process of normalizing relations between the two sides. Expanding cooperation with Tel Aviv and improving relations with the Syrian opposition, along with developing energy and transportation infrastructure, provide Azerbaijan with suitable economic and security opportunities.
Baku seeks to expand its political and economic influence in the region by becoming a linking ring between Damascus and Tel Aviv, and also to take advantage of this coalition-building to advance its agenda in Karabakh.
Forming anti-Iran front
Given the simultaneous presence of the Israeli regime in strategic partnerships with Azerbaijan and unofficial contacts with some Syrian officials, al-Sharaa’s visit to Baku cannot be considered a purely bilateral event. Baku, regional observers suggest, is playing a facilitating role within the framework of a larger plan to redefine the security order in the South Caucasus and West Asia, a new order focusing on capping Iran’s influence and even geopolitical strangulation of Tehran using security, political, border, and even sectarian lines.
This new order, consisting of a coalition led by Tel Aviv, supported by Baku, and backed by figures like al-Sharaa, is on the making to change the landscape and geometry of the security and political order in the region.
Therefore, the Syrian president’s recent visit to Baku should be seen as a link in the chain of these new movements— a move that, although currently tactical, could become an infrastructure for the formation of an anti-Iranian front in the surrounding regions in the near future.
Although the officials of Azerbaijan have repeatedly emphasized that they will not allow any threat to Iran’s territorial integrity from their territory and have always tried to portray themselves as neutral in the tensions between Tehran and the West, field evidence proves otherwise. Especially during the 12-day war Israel waged against Iran, some reports indicated that Israeli drones used Azerbaijan airspace and carried out attacks on Iranian territory. In such circumstances, Baku’s open rapprochement with the regional enemies of Iran and its role in anti-Iranian scenarios have set a dangerous course that could leave Iran no choice but to respond decisively and deterrently.
In the middle of these geopolitical developments, Iran needs a comprehensive and sophisticated strategy that mixes hard power, soft power, effective field presence and targeted use of infrastructure-oriented diplomacy.
Tel Aviv’s deepening foothold in the South Caucasus and its widening influence within Syria’s new leadership present a direct challenge to Iran’s security and strategic interests. As rival powers actively reshape the region’s balance, Tehran’s inaction risks more than just wasted opportunities and amounts to ceding the initiative to adversaries. Such passivity threatens to undermine Iran’s standing as a decisive regional player.
