The confidence of Armenian authorities in obtaining security assurances if they align with the West is not supported by recent events. Neither America nor Europe has taken concrete actions addressing concerns such as the rights of the Armenian minority in the Caucasus or the threats posed by the blockade of the Lachin corridor to the residents of that area.
ALWAGHT- Since the 2020 conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia, resulting in irregular shifts in the region's geopolitical borders, particularly with the dissolution of the Republic of "Artsakh," the traditional power dynamics prevailing in the South Caucasus for two decades have experienced significant alterations. The termination of military alliances, as well as strained relations between Russia and Armenia, coupled with Yerevan's growing alignment with the West, leading to an expansion of Western influence in the South Caucasus and the Middle East, are transformative occurrences that could profoundly affect the security landscape of this region during the ongoing transitional phase.
Indeed, the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict over the past three years has been notably adverse, not only for Armenia but also for Russia, symbolizing Moscow's failure in peacekeeping efforts and potentially endangering its enduring presence and influence in the South Caucasus.
One recent indication of this situation is the tension between Russia and Armenia regarding Yerevan's full membership in the International Criminal Court.
Moscow's response was foreseeable, with Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov labeling the move "highly hostile" in late September 2023, followed by Moscow implementing certain customs restrictions on Armenian imports into Russia in the following days.
The spokesperson for the Kremlin remarked, "Armenia is fully aware that we are not signatories to the Rome Statute, and Armenia is aware of the challenging decision [by the International Criminal Court to issue an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia] based on this statute. This is not something we endorse."
Moscow's opposition stems from a ruling by the International Criminal Court, comprising 123 members, mandating the arrest of the Russian President and his extradition if he enters the territory of any of its members. Consequently, Armenia's membership in the International Criminal Court now imposes a fresh duty and responsibility on the Armenian government.
The notion of joining the International Criminal Court first arose after Azerbaijan's assault on Armenia in September 2022 and Armenia's assertion of possessing footage showing the execution of Armenian military captives by Azerbaijani soldiers. At that time, some lawyers and politicians in Armenia advocated for ICC membership as a means of pressure against Baku. However, opponents of this move argued that since neither Turkey nor the Republic of Azerbaijan are members of the International Criminal Court, this initiative would not pressure Baku but rather exacerbate tensions with Russia.
Nevertheless, the ongoing conflict in Gaza and the role of the criminal court in condemning the Zionist regime for genocide, along with the ramifications of this ruling in generating international political pressure on the Zionists, have significantly heightened the Armenian authorities' eagerness to accelerate the process of joining this court.
The Rome Statute, a treaty that established the International Criminal Court with jurisdiction over specific international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, was signed by Armenia in 1999 but had not been approved.
During Russia's expression of anger and protest, Armenian authorities openly expressed their dissatisfaction with Russia's decision-making process. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, while emphasizing that this move isn't related to Russia relations but rather aimed at safeguarding the country's security, stated: "We opted to ratify the Rome Statute when it became evident to us that the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Russia's strategic cooperation mechanisms are insufficient to ensure Armenia's external security."
Despite Armenia's formal membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization led by Moscow (CSTO), the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and territorial advancements by Baku in the region over the past three years appear to have led Armenia to the conclusion that Moscow's security assurances are no longer effective against threats from Baku and its ally, Turkey.
It's noteworthy that Armenia has hosted a Russian military base since the Soviet Union's dissolution, with Russian border guards stationed along Armenia's borders with Iran and Turkey since 1992. In 1995, a significant Russian military base was established in Gyumri, Armenia's second-largest province, and following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, Russian peacekeepers were tasked with peacekeeping duties at the Armenia-Azerbaijan borders.
However, amid complaints from Armenian authorities, Russian officials also contend that the stance of Pashinyan's administration in relinquishing Armenia's territorial claim to Nagorno-Karabakh has been the primary factor influencing Russia's decision to uphold the territorial integrity of Armenia against Azerbaijan.
A few days prior to the outbreak of war on September 19, 2020, Putin declared in an interview that Armenia's endorsement of the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration acknowledged Azerbaijan's sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. This placed Russia in a challenging position, as Aliyev had underscored to Kremlin that Armenia's recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan's territory effectively resolved the situation in the region. Putin remarked that if Armenia itself acknowledges Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, there is little more to be said. A week following Putin's statement, Baku initiated its military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh.
While Moscow's interpretation of Armenia's adherence to the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991 differs from Yerevan's interpretation, the underlying tensions between Moscow and Yerevan, compounded by the emergence of Pashinyan's government and its inclination towards closer relations with the West, should not be disregarded in this context.
Consequently, the question remains unanswered as to whether Moscow could have implemented more effective measures to halt the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which ultimately resulted in Armenia's defeat.
These dynamics have been exacerbated due to the conflict in Ukraine. Following Russia's military engagements in Ukraine, it became evident that Moscow's attention was primarily directed towards this conflict, resulting in a diminished focus on other regional matters, including those in the South Caucasus. Consequently, Russia's involvement in the Ukraine war affected its capacity to embroil itself in a fresh confrontation with the Republic of Azerbaijan and its principal ally, Turkey.
Among the avenues Armenia anticipated Russian support was an increase in arms exports to Yerevan. However, Moscow's urgent need for weaponry for the conflict in Ukraine precluded this option. Armenia even alleged that Moscow was holding back arms previously paid for, compelling Armenia to seek armaments from India. There have been suggestions that Armenia might explore the acquisition of Western weapons. Moreover, Armenia demonstrated its discontent by dispatching humanitarian aid to Kiev.
Meanwhile, certain geopolitical considerations have not been immune to Moscow's shifting stance towards Azerbaijan. Russia appears to seek economic advantages by fostering closer ties with Baku to counterbalance the ramifications of extensive Western sanctions. Notably, one aspect of this cooperation involves Azerbaijan's pivotal role in establishing and bolstering the North-South international transportation corridor, a pursuit that Russia vigorously pursues in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict.
Seeking a resolution to the security puzzle; heading towards the illusion of the West
Amid the tensions between Moscow and Yerevan, what will exacerbate the rifts is the Armenian authorities' growing inclination towards forging closer ties with the West. While NATO has long pursued its Eastern European Security Belt initiative to contain Russia, Europe is reluctant to forfeit opportunities to expand its influence in the Middle East and the Caucasus.
In recent weeks, Europe has taken stances and initiatives such as highlighting the importance of respecting the rights of Nagorno-Karabakh's mountain residents to return, bolstering Georgia's EU accession prospects, engaging in the implementation of the Black Sea power cable project, finalizing a new gas contract with Baku, and actively seeking to mediate negotiations between Baku and Yerevan.
Historically, Europe has demonstrated its ability to leverage tensions between Russia and countries like Moldova and Georgia to enhance its relationships with them. For instance, Moldova attained candidacy status for EU membership in 2022, and Georgia may follow suit later this year. It's plausible that Armenia might also pursue its course with the approval of Brussels.
Nonetheless, it's evident that Armenian officials' optimism regarding receiving security assurances by aligning closer with the West does not entirely resonate with recent months' experiences. Neither America nor Europe has taken concrete measures regarding issues such as the rights of the Armenian minority in the Caucasus and the threats stemming from the blockade of the Lachin corridor on the lives of the region's residents. Being a guarantor would necessitate readiness for armed conflict with the Republic of Azerbaijan.
