Alwaght- As the vote results emerge in Israel amid the failure of two rival camps of Benjamin Netanyahu and Gadi Eisenkot to secure parliamentary majority, it was the Arab parties that made history by winning 19 out of total of 120 seats, the brightest outcome in their record of election participation.
With this stunning success, the Arabs parties have made the scenarios facing the Zionist parties contingent on their own playbook and strategy. In other words, among the available and viable scenarios, the ball is now squarely in the court of the Arab parties, the Joint List and Ra'am, to determine the direction of the next cabinet's formation. That said, discerning the Arab parties' choices, tactical shifts, and political strategy during the coalition negotiations first requires a concise understanding of, firstly, these parties' core political and ideological platforms, and secondly, the imperatives and constraints governing Zionist factions in cooperating with Arabs.
Arab parties, from composition to ideology
Palestinian citizens make up roughly one-fifth of the occupied territories' 10-million-strong population and have traditionally voted at lower rates than Jews. Though Arab citizens can vote in national elections and send representatives to the Knesset, they have long faced disparities in housing, public services, and municipal budgets, treated in practice as second-class citizens, while the Zionist government has systematically and on a wide scale pursued a policy of assimilation (or de-identification) against them, aiming to dissolve them into Zionist society and erode their longing to return to their Palestinian roots and ideals.
Meanwhile, some Palestinians in the occupied territories have opted for political activism and power-sharing within the framework of the regime's elections, to secure their fundamental rights, or more precisely, to push back against their violation.
The Joint List combines three out of four main Arab parties of Hadash, Ta'al, and Balad, with the exception being Ra'am that broke from this alliance in 2021.
Ra'am, or the United Arab List, is an Islamist party led by famous politician Mansour Abbas. It pursues better public services, and equal business opportunities for Arabs, and recognition of the collective rights of the Arabs in the Israeli society. Its priorities include countering organized crimes, improving housing and infrastructure, narrowing educational disparities, and getting more financial resources for Arab municipalities. The party also backs independent Palestinian state foundation, end of occupation, and removal of Israeli settlements.
Abbas has taken a pragmatic approach to coalition politics, arguing that Arab lawmakers can secure tangible gains by negotiating with Israeli governments rather than staying outside power. In 2021, Ra'am became the first independent Arab party to join a governing coalition, backing the government led by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid.
The Joint List, meanwhile, brings together three parties with distinct political traditions.
Hadash (the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) emerged in 1977 from the Israeli Communist Party, tied to Jewish-Arab leftist circles, and emphasizes equality, social justice, workers' rights, and cooperation between Jewish and Arab citizens. Ayman Odeh is among its prominent representatives.
Ta'al (the Arab Movement for Renewal), founded by Ahmad Tibi, blends national advocacy for Palestinians with engagement in parliamentary politics. Tibi is one of the most recognized Arab legislators in the occupied territories.
Balad (the National Democratic Assembly), led by Sami Abou Shehadeh, advances a Palestinian nationalist and democratic vision, calling for Israel to become a state for all its citizens rather than one that prioritizes Jewish national identity. In October, Abou Shehadeh was forced to withdraw from the Joint List's candidate roster after the regime's election oversight panel ruled he had expressed support for Hamas's October 7 operation, though he remains Balad's leader. Yousef Jabareen and him are among its leaders.
The Joint List's core policies can be summed up as support for Palestinian-Arab identity, promotion of a state for all its citizens instead of Zionism, opposition to occupation policies in the West Bank in favor of an independent Palestinian state with Al-Quds (Jerusalem) as its capital, and activation of the Palestinian right of return. Naturally, these policies and slogans do not represent all the thoughts and ideas of Palestinians living in the occupied territories, just as Arab citizens have consistently shown little appetite for participating in elections and casting ballots. But this time, the criminal, highly violent, and unabashed actions of Benjamin Netanyahu's fully right-wing cabinet, against Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank alike, and against the rights of non-Zionist citizens at home, such as the passage of the Nation-State Law, gave Arabs in the occupied territories a powerful incentive to vote in order to bring down Netanyahu's cabinet in tandem with the opposition.
Arab parties play scenarios: Choosing between bad and worse
In a broader view, success of Arab parties in securing 19 seats of the Knesset falls under the success of Netanyahu's opponents who managed to strike his coalition out of majority, making it impossible to form government.
But this is just the facade of the matter, since though Arab parties share the opposition to Netanyahu with Eisenkot's camp, the scenario of Arab participation in Eisenkot's coalition looks quite out of reach.
The reality is that the political climate of Israeli society, like the regime's social climate itself, has in recent years, especially since October 7, drifted rightward and toward hostility to Palestinians. The likelihood that part of the opposition camp will refuse to form a government with Arab backing is therefore very serious, particularly since some of the Arab parties' core demands, such as halting settlement construction, withdrawing from Gaza, and establishing an independent Palestinian state, are in sharp conflict with the ideology of the Zionist parties in the Eisenkot-led coalition.
Avigdor Lieberman, head of Yisrael Beiteinu, is one of the hardline right-wing figures in the opposition bloc, with a record of serving as defense and foreign minister and of taking extremely hawkish positions against Palestinians and Gaza, and he may now be the only serious obstacle to his joining the coalition backing Netanyahu's government. Had Likud sidelined Netanyahu from the party leadership, Lieberman might now be on the other side of the election. He said recently that if Likud operated without Netanyahu, it could become an important partner.
On the other side, the majority of Arab parties (except for Ra'am) have historically shown less appetite for entering governing coalitions, especially when doing so could jeopardize their positions on Palestinian rights and the occupation. Still, they have conditioned support for an Eisenkot-led government on the acceptance of certain terms and the fulfillment of their demands, including on halting settlements, commitments on budgets and public services, and an end to the military occupation of Gaza; conditions that in practice weaken the prospects of a deal to realize the scenario of forming a government with outside Arab support.
The US situation mostly plays into the hands of Netanyahu. The coalition under his leadership now has 53 seats and needs at least 8 seats to form a new cabinet. He may be disappointed about persuading some of the factions present in the opposition since the opponents bet on preventing him from retaining his post and at the same time remind the formation of national unity government with rotating premiership with Benny Gantz. That is why the most favorable Netanyahu choice for staying in power is preventing the opposition from coalescing with the Arab parties so that after a three-month period, a new vote is held.
With the election dragged into a new round, Netanyahu can, for one thing, remain prime minister of a caretaker government for at least another three months, though the new parliament could take steps to curb the government's powers by legislating on matters such as Haredi conscription, halting judicial overhaul, pursuing Netanyahu's role in the October 7 case, rejecting or amending the state budget bill, and preventing a new war.
That said, the Arab parties may not be able to repeat their current success in the next election, especially since Netanyahu's allies are already raising possibility about a role of Qatar and Turkey in the vote and stoking anti-Arab sentiment in society, so they can tighten legal restrictions on Arab parties' activities and campaigning in the next election.
Therefore, while dropping the conditions for a coalition with the opposition to form a new Eisenkot cabinet would not be an option befitting the Arab parties' current standing and weight, such a tactical retreat could deliver a strategic victory for the Palestinians, which is the fall of Netanyahu's cabinet, an end to his political life, and a serious crisis within Likud party and the far-right camp, which will blame Netanyahu's policies for the defeat.
