Alwaght- In definition of regional alliances and coalitions, one can no longer simply call Saudi Arabia and the UAE allies. Not long ago, the two Arab countries had common approaches to many geopolitical developments in the Persian Gulf and the Arab world and in many cases advanced similar policies, including voicing concern about the US invasion of Iraq, dealing with the Arab awakening uprisings of 2011 like bloody suppression of the Bahraini revolution, fully supporting the Syrian opposition and terrorist militia forces fighting Syria’s Bashar al-Assad from 2011 to 2024, countering the Muslim Brotherhood that culminated in a coup in 2013 ousting the first democratically-elected President Mohamad Morsi, blockading Qatar in 2017, and the politically and economically pressuring the Lebanese government to press Hezbollah for disarming.
However, in recent years, the playbook of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi gradually shifted from cooperation to competition in the region, to an extent that even in Yemen case, where they once were allies under an Arab coalition, are now at each other’s throats.
Following rapid advances by Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces in Yemen’s Hadramout and Al-Mahra provinces, Saudi Arabia launched a major aerial campaign and issued an ultimatum demanding the UAE and its loyalists’ withdrawal . This forceful intervention has allowed Saudi-aligned “National Shield” forces to regain control of the region, extending influence into Shabwa province.
The swift and forceful Saudi reaction has effectively halted a joint UAE-Saudi project in Yemen, leading to the STC’s dissolution and the flight of its leader, Eidros al-Zubaidi. This move is expected to significantly impact the fragile coalition government and reshape the future of southern Yemen’s political landscape.
Here we shed light on why Saudi Arabia has strongly reacted to southern Yemen developments:
1. Saudi Arabia is focusing on reducing regional tensions, recognizing that ongoing conflicts pose a threat to its ambitious development and economic programs. To advance its Vision 2030 plan, which is aimed at transforming the kingdom into a diversified, non-oil economy, the kingdom needs to attract foreign investment, develop tourism, participate in international trade corridors, and foster the presence of major technology companies. This requires stability in the Persian Gulf region. This strategic approach underlies Saudi Arabia’s acceptance of the China-brokered agreement with Iran and its move towards a “neither war nor peace” relationship with Sana’a, where Ansarullah resistance movement has been holding the power since 2014.
2. Saudi Arabia regards separatism of southern Yemen as direct threat to its national security. Southern Yemen clashes, while undermining the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) and bolstering the position of Ansarullah in Yemen’s political dynamics, can lead to declaration of independence of the south. Saudi Arabia has long opposed such a scenario as it is concerned that this will lead to spillover of instability to its border regions, especially the oil-rich provinces of Jizan, Najran, and Asir. Yemen lays territorial claims to these three provinces. They were transferred to Saudi Arabia in 1934 under Taif Agreement, initially for 20 years, but the agreement was extended in 1954, 1974, and 1995 under Riyadh pressure.
On the opposite side, the UAE, using the STC as its infantry, pursues a policy of Yemen partition for a full dominance over its strategic islands and ports in the south, a policy not appealing to the Saudis.
3. Continuing the current trajectory risked undermining the cohesion and stability of the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council. Saudi Arabia views itself as the leader of the (P) GCC, considering it a crucial counterweight to regional rivals like Turkey and Iran.
4. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have considerable old economic competitions in the region. Following a policy of investment in ports of other countries through AD World company, the UAE is seeking to take the pulse of trade in a vast region from Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa and the Mediterranean. Abu Dhabi’s success in southern Yemen will allow control over the two sides of the Arabian Peninsula from Jabal Ali to Aden ports. This is largely unacceptable for Saudi Arabia that is aspiring to transform into a global trade and AI hub. In this path, the Saudis see the Emiratis serious rivals. Earlier, the kingdom has asked the multinational companies to transfer their offices from the UAE to Saudi Arabia.
5. Competition in various regional files, particularly in Sudan and Somalia, is intensifying. During his November visit to Washington, Mohammed bin Salman exerted significant pressure on the White House to press the UAE to halt support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). A coalition-building program underway in the Horn of Africa, with the UAE and Israel seemingly collaborating to destabilize Somalia and Sudan, has raised concerns in Saudi Arabia, which seeks to preserve the territorial integrity of these nations, especially that UAE’s policy aims to secure key ports and mines in these countries and expand its influence in the Arab world, potentially challenging Saudi Arabia’s regional standing.
6. With southern Yemen strikes, Saudi moved to establish its hegemonic power in the Arab world. It was natural that the UAE, witg geopolitical position vulnerable, will back down against “big brother” Saudi Arabia.
7. Furthermore, disputes in OPEC Plus, over the output quota and the financial and technical gaps, have cracked the ranks of these two former allies.
