Alwaght- In the middle of the escalating tensions between Iran and the US and after Washington and Tel Aviv attacked some of Iranian nuclear sites, Saudi Arabia is subject to a strategic test.
In recent years, the Saudis have attempted to moderate their aggressive foreign policy of the past, which was primarily represented by the war on Yemen, and now they present the image of an expedient actor inclined to control possible chaos in the region. However, as the regional atmosphere is on the verge of a wider conflict and some reports indicate the hidden role of some countries in supporting operations against Iran, this image is at risk of erosion.
On the one hand, the relations of the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman with the government of the US President Donald Trump is one of the pillars of the active foreign policy of Riyadh and on the other hand, the gradual improvement of relations with Tehran after the China-mediated 2023 rapprochement deal between Riyadh and Tehran promises a new era of peaceful regional coexistence. However, the increasing possibility of military conflict is bringing the Arab kingdom closer to a point of “forced choice”; a choice in which maintaining a balance between strategic interests and avoiding the consequences of an all-out war has become a difficult job for the Saudi decision-makers.
Now there are fundamental questions: What aims and reservations does Saudi Arabia have in relation to this unfolding crisis? What challenges are ahead of it? Can the kingdom maintain its balancing policy in its dealing with such big actors as Iran, the US, China, and Russia?
1. Riyadh’s fragile position: Old ally and close neighbor
After the 2023 deal with Iran, the two countries’ ties entered a new phase characterized by mutual diplomatic visits and reopening of the embassies. Having failed to meet aims of its aggressive policy in Yemen and Lebanon and other regions, Saudi Arabia since 2023 set to de-escalate regional hostilities and move to stability to realize its ambitious Vision 2030 plan as it understood the economic and security consequences of continued tensions in the Persian Gulf.
However, during this same period, the competition behind the scenes continued in a different form with Saudi interference in the crises in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, where Iran has had deep influence. For example, Riyadh, in line with the US and the Israeli regime, is exerting high pressure on the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah.
However, last month Israeli and American aggression on Iran and the Iranian missile and drone response have severely strained the regional atmosphere. Meanwhile, the remarks by Iranian military commanders who said that some regional countries have not remained neutral and provided the aggressors with intelligence and airspace and air services to attack Iran have drawn the attention of the observers to Saudi Arabia, especially that no country is named. Riyadh’s silence adds to the mystery.
2. Saudi strategy: Trying to make a balance or secretly backing Israel and the US?
Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy in the face of the Iran-US crisis clearly reflects an attempt to maintain a delicate balance. In recent years, Riyadh has tried to present an image of a neutral country capable of playing a mediating role. The visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Riyadh after attending the BRICS summit in Brazil on Wednesday and the talks between the Saudi Defense Minister Khaled bin Salman and the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi are signs of the will of both sides to beef up diplomatic relations.
However, the Saudis’ view of the Iran case seems to be a mixture of anxiety and opportunity. On the one hand, any direct conflict between Iran and the US or the Israeli regime and the escalation of the crisis in the Persian Gulf threatens energy flow, economic investments in the ambitious Vision 2030 projects, and Saudi Arabia’s internal stability. On the other hand, the weakening of the Iran-led Axis of Resistance due to the aggressive and unbridled policy of Trump and Netanyahu may, according to some in Riyadh, open up space for Saudi Arabia to maneuver regionally and strengthen its position as the undisputed Sunni power.
But on the other side of the story, there are also reports that show that during the recent attacks on Iran, some radar and surveillance systems located in the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf – of which Saudi Arabia is one of the most important – provided data to Israel and the US. Although no official document has been published in this regard so far, the long-standing security partnership between Riyadh and Washington strengthens such a theory. Tehran officials had also spoken of the role of Arab countries in creating a protective shield for Israel against Iranian missiles during Operations True Promise I and II last year.
3. Riyadh’s strategic aims and reservations
Here are the aims and concerns of Riyadh in dealing with Iran crisis:
- Saving home and regional security: Saudi Arabia knows well that any full-scale Iranian-American military conflict will automatically expand and the kingdom’s security and economic facilities, including its oil, can be targets to retaliatory strikes, and this will at least pose insecurity as a detrimental factor to the foreign investors invited to invest in ambitious Saudi projects like NEOM mega project. Yemen attacks in 2019 on Aramco oil giant of Saudi Arabia still sticks to the Saudi memory.
- Relative weakening of Axis of Resistance: From the viewpoint of some ruling elites in Riyadh, Iran’s direct confrontation with the US and Israel is considered an opportunity to strategically contain or weaken Tehran and its regional allies (Hezbollah in Lebanon, Ansarullah in Yemen, Public Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq, and others). But this goal should not come at a price that jeopardizes Saudi Arabia’s security or diplomatic credibility.
- Avoiding a break with China and Russia: Saudi Arabia has taken important steps in recent years to diversify its strategic partners and has joined the BRICS bloc. Any overt support for the US aggressive policies in the region could weaken Riyadh’s standing with Beijing and Moscow.
4. Challenges ahead of Riyadh
The policy of walking a tight rope between big actors, though looking rational, faces an array of fundamental challenges:
- Decrease in Iran trust: If Tehran concludes that Saudi Arabia played an intelligence or air defense role in the recent attacks, relations between the two countries will quickly dwindle. In such a case, not only will the recent agreements be ineffective, but also Al-Udaid air base scenario could be repeated in Saudi Arabia. By attacking the US-operated Al-Udeid in Qatar hours before the ceasefire, Iran showed that it will not compromise on its security red lines, and that security and energy interests in the Persian Gulf will either include all players or no one.
- US pressure on Saudi Arabia for more active role: From Washington’s perspective, Saudi Arabia is a key ally in containing Iran. If it adopts a neutral or conservative stance, Washington is likely to use political and security pressure levers against Riyadh, including reducing arms sales, military support, or even less diplomatic engagement. There are currently signs that Washington is seeking Riyadh’s role in opening the door to dialogue with Tehran, but given Iran’s growing distrust of Trump’s US, which gave the green light to the Israeli military attack during the negotiations and directly intervened in the conflict with strikes on three Iranian nuclear sites, it does not seem that Riyadh can take an effective step in resolving the conflict. However, from Washington’s perspective, Saudi Arabia must control any negative consequences of the war, especially when it comes on oil prices.
- Rise in the risks in the Persian Gulf: Any new conflict in the region, especially around Strait of Hormuz, can upset security of shipping and Saudi oil exports. Saudi rulers are aware that such scenario would be catastrophic to their economy.
5. Future of Iranian policy and strategic patience
Tehran has not yet responded directly to the ambiguous positions of some regional countries, including Saudi Arabia, and has tried to maintain an atmosphere of diplomacy with its neighbors within the framework of a policy of strategic patience. However, this policy is not unlimited. If it is proven that regional countries are playing a role in anti-Iranian operations, Iran may take measures that range from explicit warnings to operational measures.
Iran is acting cautiously since it does not want the tension with Saudi Arabia to ravage its regional diplomatic projects. However, Tehran’s foreign policy experience has shown that it decisively uses deterrence options in the face of repeated threats and repeated hostile intentions.
Strategic recommendation
Finally, it should be said that Saudi Arabia is now in a sensitive and decisive situation. Blind alignment with largely destabilizing US policies in the region may draw Washington’s contentment in the short run, but in the long run it will ruin Riyadh’s regional credibility by harming fresh and growing ties with Tehran.
The policy of choice for Saudi Arabia is not passive balancing. Rather, Riyadh should disown itself from the Israeli and American military actions against Iran, join BRICS in its condemnation of Israel and the US, and embark on a de-escalation path with the Axis of Resistance. These should be the basis for redefining the regional policy of the kingdom.
