Alwaght- Last month, after delaying a special meeting of its foreign and defense ministers set to be held to discuss enacting a joint Arab force, the Arab League released a statement, noting that it had received a letter from the Saudi delegation in which it was said that Saudi Arabia had been willing that the League’s defense council’s meeting of the foreign and defense ministers be postponed to an uncertain date.
The news outlets suggested that a discord between Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the joint Arab military force’s leadership as well as the method of dealing with the crises in Syria, Yemen and Libya have hampered formation of joint Arab army. Additionally, the countries which aim at establishing a union or a joint military force have to set unified objectives on the three areas of security, national independence and sovereignty; while, Arab Leagues members are divided in to three branches.
1. Saudi Arabia and Qatar: The main objective these two countries are seeking in different projects is to mobilize the military potentials of the Arab countries to confront the Resistance Axis in the region, which is spearheaded by Iran.
2. Egypt: Its aim is to attract and receive the rich Arab countries’ financial support in order to improve its troubled economic conditions and purchase arms.
3. The southern Persian Gulf Arab states: Their main obsession is to keep their regimes standing.
Before the emergence of a set of troubles coming up as a result of military presence in Yemen, and Egypt’s support for Russian anti-terror air campaign in Syria because of existence of common enemies, the inconsistent views concerning forming a joint military force were pushed aside as forming a joint Arab army was likely, but the situation has changed.
Moreover, the disharmonious pattern of the Arab League’s members would immerse such a military establishment in continuous tensions and internal rivalry, especially that Saudi-Qatari troubled ties, Bahrain and Qatar’s uneasy relations, Saudi Arabia and Egypt’s competition over the Arab world’s leadership, and Oman’s independent policy could drive the possible joint Arab army to perform inefficiently.
Even if the preparations and grounds for establishing the common military force are provided, it is expected that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and Egypt would accept its main financial, logistic and human burdens. So, rather than taking the title of a joint Arab army, it could be seen as an interventionist force operated by a couple of Arab countries.
On the other hand, the previous experiences of the Arab countries to form a common military force, specifically in southern Persian Gulf, as Persian Gulf Cooperation Council’s rapid action force, proved unsuccessful. It is predicted that establishment of the joint Arab army now and after becoming operational would face a series of challenges.
Besides, it is primarily doubted that the join Arab force would take a unanimous approach concerning the regional crises. The double-standard behavior adopted by some of Arab Leagues’ members regarding the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Bahrain, and their failure to take a unified and unbiased position on the opposition groups in these troubled countries, indicate that in similar cases in the future the Arab army woyld be caught in the same awkward standings.
It is hypocritical to support terrorist groups in the face of the legitimate government in Syria, and, simultaneously send military force to suppress opposition groups in Bahrain and Yemen; or to form a military force based on an inter-governmental agreement, which fights against a member country, whereas it is dispatched to defend another member’s government with the excuse of defending the so-called legitimacy.
Taking such an approach could result in a premature collapse of such a joint force, while adoptation of consistant and unanimous policies by this forces is very unlikely.
Saudi Arabia desperately seek to play an integral role in the formation and permanence of such an army as aggression of some of Riyadh’s allies against yemen in the frame of the Saudi-led Arab coalition was a prelude and a base for establishing the unified Arab army. But, there are two challenges standing:
1. The future of war in Yemen is still uncertain, and the Saudi-led Arab coalition has not managed to meet its preset goals so far, as the efforts to launch a ground offensive in the country have failed. A defeat in Yemen war could mar, in advance, the structure of a unified Arab army.
2. The second challenge is the issue of the Saudi Arabia’s future. Currently, Riyadh is unable to solve the crises surrounding it. The severe infightings upon the death of the former King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz cast shadow over the royalty of the kingdom, and the failure to achieve the set goals in the areas where direct or indirect military and security intervention was required, have dealt a blow to the kingdom’s credibility as well as its political and military potentials.
Without Saudi Arabia’s pivotal role and its political and financial support, and with the role-playing of financially-weak countries such as Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Algerian in the possible Arab army, it is unlikely that this military force manages to be effective in dealing with the regional crises. However, it is not out of sight that under specific conditions and with aid supplied from out of the Arab world, such a military force emerges as a cross-border power and influential in the West Asian region’s equations.
Should the US, Britain and the EU take a supportive standing toward the establishment of the Arab League’s military wing, potential joint Arab army me be efficient; otherwise, it would be an ineffective and symbolic force.
