Alwaght- These days, the Turkish footprints can be tracked in a vast area of geopolitical rivalry from Central Asia and the Persian Gulf to the North and Horn of Africa. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s push for a role in the vast area of geopolitical competition with a wide range of regional and international rivals may have an advantage to the expansion of influence but it simultaneously has its risks.
One of the key loopholes of Erdogan and his ruling party’s vulnerability is the economic challenges at home that are used by the rivals of Ankara in the form of sanctions to modify its foreign policy and even sometimes force abrupt Erdogan policy shifts.
Turkey has been grappling with periodical economic crises for years, that their continuation can push the country to the edge. On August 31, Ibrahim Kahveci, a columnist at Kerar Gazette of Turkey, in a piece titled “big collapse” shed light on the Turkish economic situation, saying: “Turkey entered the economic crisis in 2015 that caused in 2018 big twist of crises. And now a new twist of the economic crisis has just begun.” According to this economist, the government’s debt to the public sector by July 2018 was 817.3 billion Turkish lira ($102 billion) but skyrocketed to 1.72 trillion ($210 billion) lira by July 2020.
In a report bringing in the spotlight the Turkish economy, Bloomberg last month held that the national Turkish currency in October lost 7.5 percent of its value against the US dollar, a record high value loss since the 2018 currency crisis. Lira lost over 30 percent of its value since the beginning of November, recording the worst performance after the Brazilian currency real.
“The Turkish lira weakened for a ninth day, overtaking Brazil’s real as the worst performer in emerging markets this year,” the report read.
In the middle of this situation, Erdogan in addition to introducing economic reforms and changing the financial policy banked especially on deeper ties on expanded ties with Qatar, or better to say, attraction of the Doha economic support.
Qatar emergency aids to the Turkish economy
Qatar, a reliable ally to Erdogan in economic hardships, is not ignorant of economic backing to its ally in the region. Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani of Qatar on November 26 paid an important visit to Turkey, signing 10 strategic agreements with Ankara.
One significant accord was buying 10 percent of the Istanbul stock exchange, meant for economic boost. Some economic experts described the move as a rush by the wealthy Arab emirate to save the troubled lira.
Doha even came to the help of the Turkish private sector, announcing it is buying 42 percent of IstinyePark, Istanbul’s most prominent mall that has been overwhelmed by the lira crash and closed down partially over the past months, for $1 billion to give the shopping center the ability to resume work.
Another major issue agreed upon was Qatar's management of Turkish ports. Shares of Middle East Antalya Port Operators from Turkey's Global Ports were transferred to and purchased by Qatari port operator Terminals WLL.
Over the past three years of the anti-Qatar political and economic blockade, 18 meetings were held between the Turkish and Qatar leaders, signaling deep economic and political bonds between the two states. As the Qatari investment in Turkey touched $22 billion, the Turkish exports to the Arab country doubled on an annual basis since 2017, demonstrating a powerful Turkish economic presence in Qatar. Reports published by the Turkish foreign ministry said in 2017 Turkey’s exports to Qatar were $649 million. They rose to $1.6 billion this year.
Undoubtedly, the sole Qatari investments cannot help Ankara weather the waves of economic challenges but the Turkish leaders can be optimistic that Qatar’s presence and investment can to a large extent cut the impacts to the economic challenges which would ease the pressures, caused by the lockdown and shutdown of the construction projects, on the 82 million Turkish population.
Persian Gulf crisis and Turkish-Qatar relationship outlook
In recent years the comprehensive expansion of ties between Turkey and Qatar has been a function of the Persian Gulf developments, particularly after Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain cut off ties with Qatar and imposed economic sanctions on it in June 2017.
There has been a question about where the Turkish-Qatari cooperation will go once a settlement is reached to the Persian Gulf crisis, as last week reports were confirmed by Doha and Riyadh about the proximity of reaching a solution to the crisis amid White House representatives’ visits to the region in quest of an end to the deadlock.
With many questions remaining unanswered about Qatar’s rapprochement with the blockaders, it can be predicted that any reconciliation will not considerably affect the Ankara-Doha relationship. Following the Erdogan-Tamim meeting, Qatar's Shura Council stated: "Turkey and Qatar reaffirmed that the two sides are determined and willing to enhance the strong brotherhood ties and strategic partnership ties in various fields."
On the one hand, the success of the mediatory efforts is more because of foreign pressures than the settlement of the differences inside the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council and on the other hand the government of President Donald Trump is pressing Saudi Arabia for reconciliation to accelerate the Arab-Israeli normalization for completing the chain of the anti-Iranian pressures and also addressing the Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s concerns about the incoming president Joe Biden’s policies.
This reality can be witnessed in the positions of the UAE which is less concerned about Washington pressures. Abu Dhabi is not much excited about solving the problems with Doha, its stances disclose. This means that the security myth in the Persian Gulf will remain in place even after a possible announcement on lifting the blockade. The Saudi-led bloc still bans the Qatari and Turkish-sponsored Muslim Brotherhood and views the confrontation of the Muslim Brotherhood axis in the region as a strategic goal, something persuading Qatar to maintain the cooperation with Turkey.
In the past three years, Doha’s overcoming of the political, security, and economic risks of the sanctions added to Qatar's capability to tip the scales of power in the Cooperation Council and also to embark on a more independent foreign policy. Therefore, Sheik Tamim will certainly save and even promote the ties with Turkey as part of his foreign policy agenda.
Qatar, always a reliable ally to Erdogan in the economic distress, in the current conditions does not turn a blind eye to Turkey and will keep providing support to it.
