Alwaght- In the recent years, what has been nearly unanimously raised by the international experts and pundits about the future world order is the emergence of China as a new global power. So far, the country has tried to avoid involvement in cumbersome political challenges and instead strive to become another superpower on the world stage using the instrument of thriving large-size economy.
When it comes to security and politics, the Chinese leaders have tried to take a discreet approach in a bid not to provoke security and political sensitivity of the neighboring countries as well as the global powers present in its vicinity. However, China is located in the geopolitically significant East Asia security environment and it looks that entry to some periods of dispute and, in some cases tension, is unavoidable.
In the past few months, especially beginning with Donald Trump election as US president and tense pressures from the White House officials who want Beijing to reign in North Korea’s moves, a large part of the Chinese focus has been on the Pyongyang nuclear and missile activities. But the North Korean crisis is not all of this East Asian heavyweight’s troubles. China has often inflexibly clung to the idea that Taiwan is an inseparable part of the Chinese territory, but the rival West, and particularly the US, always take advantage of the Taiwanese dispute to put strains on Beijing.
North Korea and Taiwan are only two issues, among others, over which the Chinese leaders have been at loggerheads with the US-led West in the past few decades. But the rise of China as an unquestionable power in Asia has unleashed waves of the border and territorial disputes with the other Asian countries, which are by the way predominantly allies of Washington in the region. The US administration, as it is required to do, last week unveiled new national security doctrine. The new strategy document apparently changed the rules of the game in Asia by introducing India as an alternative ally instead of Pakistan. Picking New Delhi as a new ally is mainly aimed at checking expanding Chinese influence and strength and possibly in the future will spark Beijing leaders’ confrontational approaches to Washington.
The crisis in the Korean Peninsula continues unfolding as warm as ever, and perhaps the only two recent major developments in the case have been the Russian effective entry to the stage of dispute and transfer of message of the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to the American administration.
Nearly six months ago, China suggested simultaneous suspension of North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests and the US and South Korea’s provocative military drills in the region. Beijing officials have been working diligently towards the realization of their peace-making suggestion. But neither Pyongyang nor Washington have given a green light to the Chinese proposal. Recently, one of the sources of discord of China with North Korea has been Pyongyang’s rejection of the proposal. Raising the idea of direct negotiations with Jong-un can be a consequence of North Korea’s refusal of the Chinese idea. While the US insists that North Korea regime change is necessary before commencing any process of Korean Peninsula denuclearization, China stresses the need for the Americans to end regime change efforts in North Korea through pressures.
With a consideration of the special conditions of transition the regional order is witnessing and also the ongoing geopolitical developments of Asia, losing North Korea will be a big strategic defeat for China. The Chinese leadership does not look it is poised to take steps towards such a strategic mistake. Still, as it was mentioned above, all of the Chinese predicaments should not be blamed on North Korea.
New challenges are seemingly coming to China. According to a report by the Chinese newspaper People’s Daily, Australia intends to send at least six naval vessels as well as 1,200 troops to the South China Sea which is contested by many regional parties, but China has marked dominance there. The Australian move is unprecedented in 40 years and has ruffled the feathers of the Chinese leaders who warned Canberra against what appears to be an intended proactive move. But what kind of role the subordinate-but-allied to-the-US countries are playing in fueling the regional tensions? Can China maintain them and the consequent outcomes of their moves?
In the first place, when it comes to dealing with the security challenges and particularly the territorial disputes, the Chinese leaders want to be rule makers, not a party subjected to other parties’ already-made rules. This prompts them to rapidly respond to other countries’ moves for meddling. They are strongly against following rules made for them by others.
Another point that needs to be taken into account is that China is not poised to passively cooperate with the US when it comes to its top security layout. The main driving power behind increased strategic competition between Beijing and Washington is this issue.
The Chinese defense document of 2015 has highlighted the sea as one of most significant areas where China has to step in and showcase its huge potentials. That is why the South China Sea secured a large share of importance in China’s strategic documents. However, the high-level relations, especially the economic give and take, of China and the regional countries like Australia push back prospects of tension, at least in the near future, in East Asia region, and in particular between Beijing and Canberra.
For decades, there have been rows over the border lines between China, India, and Bhutan. China and India in 1962 clashed over the border lines in the Himalaya mountainous region. The demarcation lines are obvious in this region where India’s Sikkim region meets China’s Chumbi Valley. The main rift is over borders in Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir regions. The main challenge is not the China-India border rift. Rather, it is the border dispute between China and Bhutan. The two countries have no official diplomatic relations. As of yet, the two countries held 24 rounds of negotiations to finalize a plan for ultimately specifying their borders.
All in all, the East and Southeast Asia are the specific regions on which such powers as US, China, and Russia are focusing more than ever. Using some approaches, China tries to ease its strategic concerns in areas of its vicinity like the South and the East China Sea, Taiwan, Tibet, where the US bears the potentials to meddle and manipulate the course of developments. The past nine months course of movement of Beijing in the regional policies bear witness to this intention.
Concerning the regional developments and their possible consequences, it must be noted that now the regional crises are under control. This situation does not bear hallmarks of slipping out of control. But this does not mean that China’s rivals in the region are standing still without moves. Moreover, apparent enough, the traditional balance of power has not noticeably changed. This intactness of balance itself plays the role of a regional controlling factor.
