Alwaght- As we draw closer to expiry of the 60-day agreement between the US and Iran, one question presents itself again: If Washington and Tehran fail to strike a final deal before end of the deadline, what will come next? While the US President Donald Trump has repeatedly talked about "final chance" for Iran to reach a deal with the US, the record of several months of war shows that return to the military options will be costlier than strong-toned remarks of Trump are aimed to suggest.
The reality is that the 40-day war and the subsequent confrontations have caused a serious trouble for the US military: Fast depletion of its precision ammunition and air defense missiles, which are hard to replace in a short time.
The US munitions: A weak spot for a lengthy war
A report by the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that followed the war showed that in the 39 days of missile and airstrikes, in 4 out of 7 key areas, the US consumed over half of its war ammunitions. Estimates of the think tank suggest that restoration to pre-war levels takes between 1-4 years depending on the type of ammunitions.
But after months of war, the situation has grown even more alarming. Two weeks ago, Reuters reported that the US military had burned through the bulk of its global stockpile of long-range precision missiles, including ATACMS and PrSM, in the war with Iran. The same report flagged growing concern inside the Pentagon about the US readiness for future conflicts.
The air-defense picture is equally grim. According to Reuters, between February and July, the US consumed about 65 percent of its Patriot interceptor inventory, leaving fewer than 850 missiles on hand. And this is not just an Iran-war problem. Washington must simultaneously keep enough munitions in reserve for threats from Russia, China, and the ongoing fight in Ukraine.
That is why continuing a war of attrition with Iran carries a price tag that, given current stockpiles and Washington's limited short-term production capacity, is simply unsustainable.
Iran's missile power at its peak
A significant reality that now exists is the gap between Trump's claims and intelligence estimates about Iran's missile strength.
Trump more than once has alleged he has roughly eliminated Iran's missile power. But a Reuters report in March said that the US at that time had only managed to confirm with confidence destroying one-third of Iranian missile stockpile. It was unclear the missiles were destroyed, damaged, or buried in underground bunkers, the report added.
Even then, Iran kept firing. Reuters had also cited pre-war estimates ranging from 2,500 to 6,000 missiles, a spread that underscored just how hard it has always been to nail down the true size of Tehran's arsenal.
On top of that, Iran operates an extensive network of underground facilities. Before the war even began, Reuters had reported the existence of at least five known underground "missile cities" scattered across the country, a setup that makes any attempt to fully wipe out Iran's missile capacity exceedingly difficult.
A report from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy shows that between the 2025 and 2026 wars, Iran managed to reproduce roughly 1,000 missiles, an estimated production rate of 100 to 125 per month. The same report noted that as of May, the American and Israeli intelligence assessments indicated that missile production had resumed at some surviving facilities and even at temporary sites.
Later reports pointed to a rapid rebuild of Iran's missile infrastructure. Satellite imagery and assessments from Israeli and Western officials showed Iran reconstructing tunnel entrances, underground bases, and a number of damaged facilities.
The evidence, in short, suggests that Iran has restored portions of its damaged military capacity faster than anticipated, while simultaneously improving its survival tactics, dispersal methods, and use of underground infrastructure.
Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi, senior adviser to the commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), drove the point home in an interview with PBS yesterday. "How are they going to stop us from building missiles?" he said. "With 950 industrial parks and thousands of manufacturing complexes across the country, we produce more missiles daily than we fire. And Iran's defense industry is entirely indigenous."
Emphasizing that Iran's defensive weapons are 100 percent homegrown, Naghdi added: "They are built inside the country and developed according to the needs of the battlefield. There is direct communication between the front lines and our technical and engineering units. We are not dependent on anything from abroad that we would have to wait to run out."
Naghdi further maintained the war could go on for years. "Until the very last day of this war, Iran's missiles will keep flying, and that is possible because of continuous domestic production."
War also gave Iran military lessons
War also demonstrated that the Islamic Republic has managed to, using its military capabilities, force a change to the American calculations.
One example was launching long-range missiles at the US-British Diego Garcia military base in the Indian Ocean. These missiles reportedly did not hit where they supposed to, but the very firing of such missiles showed Iran's operational missile range could easily go beyond estimates. Reuters reported two missile firings at the base by Iran's Aerospace Force.
Citing a military analyst, AL Jazeera reported that the strike, if the missile specifications are confirmed, could upend previous estimates of Iran's missile range, which had typically been assessed at around 2,000 kilometers.
For Tehran, then, this war has been a massive test: a chance to learn about weak points, preserve hidden capacities, rebuild fast, and reset its military playbook. And by that measure, Iran has shown it can take the lessons of the current fight and use them to expand and sharpen its military capabilities for the next one.
Why is the US returning to negotiations?
Amid this situation, many observers suggest end of the deadline does not necessarily mean return to war. If Washington returns to fighting, it will face an Iran that has had an experience of a long war, restored part of its military infrastructure, and knows that the US is strained in areas of precision munitions and air defense.
Before thinking about returning to war, the US should think about refilling its ammunitions stockpiles in preparation for other global threats. CSIS's report about the 1-4 year span for restoring pre-war munition levels highlights significance of the matter.
That military pressure is now coupled with political headwinds. A Reuters/Ipsos poll in late July found that only about a third of Americans support continuing the war with Iran, with a majority saying Trump has failed to clearly articulate the war's objectives. Another poll in early August put support at just 35 percent, while 58 percent expected gas prices to worsen.
For a Trump administration staring down the midterms, that math stings. A war billed as short but now dragging on for months, and threatening to devolve into another protracted grind, could exact a steeper political toll on the White House.
So if the deal deadline passes, the most likely scenario is not necessarily "immediate war." Instead, Washington's response will probably involve ramped-up pressure, military saber-rattling, fresh sanctions, and parallel back-channel efforts to nail down a new agreement.
Washington will likely leverage military threats to extract concessions from Tehran. But plunging back into all-out war would mean accepting the risks of further depleting missile stocks, eroding air-defense assets, spiking energy prices, and intensifying domestic political blowback.
That is why, according to many analysts, the expiration of the current US-Iran deadline may mark the start of a new phase of bargaining, not necessarily start of a rejuvenated war.
In such conditions, diplomacy is not just a political option for the US, rather, it can show a way out of a costly war; a war that, if continued, can signify failure of the American agenda, especially at a time the US public opinion are uninterested in a war against Iran and the midterm elections of November are fast nearing.
