Alwaght- In recent years, Turkey has adopted problematic foreign policy especially towards Arab countries. Ankara’s use of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology to boost its influence across the Muslim world and turn into a top Muslim power has been most important factor escalating crisis between Turkey and a considerable part of the Arab countries.
Meanwhile, Erdogan, who is known for making sudden turns in foreign policy, has begun to move in recent months to pull relations with the Arabs out of the stalemate and create conditions for de-escalation of tensions with them. After an important phone conversation with King Salman of Saudi Arabia on the sidelines of the G20 virtual summit in November 2020, on Sunday, Erdogan and his Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu announced readiness to hold a bilateral meeting with Egypt discussing political, economic, security, and social affairs.
Sending positive signals of a desire to de-escalate tensions with Egypt and the UAE, however, did not meet welcome from these countries, and while the Egyptian officials, on their media, emphasized the need for a change in Ankara's policies, the UAE, on the other hand, went even further and made seven humiliating conditions for mending ties with Ankara: first, ending occupation in Syria and Iraq; second, withdrawal of Turkish-paid mercenaries from Libya; third, ending hosting and supporting the Muslim Brotherhood; fourth, stopping provocative actions against the Egyptian stability; fifth, ending psychological war against the Saudi leadership; sixth, immediate withdrawal of Turkish forces from the Persian Gulf Arab Gulf states i.e. Qatar; seventh, reviewing the neo-Ottomanist expansionist plans.
Bumpy de-escalation road
Turkey is trying to free itself from the predicament rocking its foreign policy. Changes in the White House and Biden assumption of power forced Turkish ruling party Justice and Development Party (AKP) to recalibrate its policies. Trump's policies toward Syria, which led to compromises to Ankara's actions against Washington's Kurdish allies in northern Syria, changed under Biden. Furthermore, with US-Europe relations heading to improvement again, Erdogan’s policy of moving closer to Russia, especially in terms of arms purchases from Moscow, were more came under NATO's fire.
Turkey also views the Arab-Israeli normalization as part of the push to counter Turkey in geopolitical cases like its push to gain influence in Africa and the Mediterranean region.
Erdogan's attempt to overcome the economic crisis and maintain his power in the upcoming elections, in which a strong coalition of opponents have lined up in front of the AKP, is another important reason for Turkey's tendency for open foreign relations and, of course, open foreign trade. Meanwhile, Ankara's attention to the post-reconciliation situation between Qatar and the blockading countries is undeniable, so that it can use this space to facilitate de-escalation with countries like the UAE and Egypt.
The emergence of the grounds for Erdogan shift in the foreign policy and efforts towards de-escalation with the Arab countries comes, as there are poor signs that the political, geopolitical, and ideological rivalry between Ankara and ABU Dhabi-Cairo bloc is easing. Egypt and the UAE still blacklist Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group with aspirations to take the political power beyond the national borders in the Arab world, and deem it a key threat to their home security and stability, as well as their foreign interests. Egypt and the UAE still do not approve of the Turkish role in Libya and thus the proxy competition between them.
On the other hand, despite Erdogan's efforts to defuse tensions with Tel Aviv, the Israeli regime considers chill in the Persian Gulf monarchies and Turkey as a driving force for an Arab-Israeli coalition in the region and thus Tel Aviv will do its best to hamper the Arab-Turkish fire cool-down.
The conditions set by the UAE for de-escalation also indicate that the end of the siege of Qatar did not mean the end of the crisis in the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council and that the UAE and even Egypt agreed to compromise under US pressure and at the insistence of the Saudis, making it clear that Turkey cannot take advantage of the post-reconciliation period.
Turkey’s lose-lose game
Over the past years, foreign and internal political observers and critics have commented on the Erdogan’s sudden about-faces in the foreign policy. Some praise it as an advantage and a sign of flexibility in Ankara’s foreign policy to move out of the impasses and serve the national interests. Others argue that these shifts paint Turkey as an unreliable actor and lacking major and fixed foreign policy. They add that such a status will damage the country’s place in the international relations and in negotiations.
In fact, a look at the consequences of Erdogan's foreign policy shifts and departures from past positions in such cases as confrontation of Europe over Islamophobia, easing the tensions with Saudi Arabia, or retracting anti-Israeli stances show that they have not had much for the Turkish interests. Neither European sanctions were lifted nor Saudi-led Arab world boycott of the Turkish products was abandoned, and not even Turkish place in the Palestinian developments were improved.
The fresh comments about the interest in mended ties with Egypt and the UAE put Turkey in a position of weakness. The cold response of Egypt and the UAE has turned into lose-lose situation for Ankara. If Erdogan accepts the humiliating conditions, he will strengthen his opposition and weakens Turkey’s weight in the regional developments. In case of rejecting the preconditions, the Turkish leader will prove Ankara’s weakness and fear of the Arab-Israeli coalition’s anti-Turkish measures and put the coalition in an upper position.
