Alwaght - Alevi community of Turkey has gone through many ups and downs during its cultural and political life. Alevis' full-scale conflict with Sunni Ottoman Empire made them to support the secular government of the Republicanism, and consider Sunni religious fanatics as a threat to their own material and spiritual existence. However, being marginalized by leftist and secular parties led to growing identity and cultural demands, and now they have developed the capacity of a social movement into a religious minority group. Nevertheless, with such an ideological identity, this minority group has failed to get its share in the political and cultural scene of Turkey.
Considering the time, place and other effective factors the political identity of the Alevis has been differently represented from nationalism to leftism and over the last decade they have desperately been seeking their own political identity. In this period of political interaction, even the security interactions of Turkish Alevis have significantly improved. Their emphasis on identity demands and its politicization, addressing the issues of relative poverty, taking advantage of gaps in the ruling party's relations with the community on issues related to Gezi park protests and eventually Alavi's approach and activism in matters of foreign policy, particularly in the Syrian crisis reflect the fact that the Turkish government can no longer marginalize them in the political arena of Turkey. This has been evident in the behavior of the actors in Turkish politics. To the extent that currently, top government figures including the president, Prime Minister, Minister of Interior and the heads of the major parties attend Alevis' meetings and seek to persuade them and manage their identity demands.
While Erdogan has been in office, identity perception of Alevi minority was under the influence of religious policies of the government in domestic and foreign issues and was reflected in their political resistance and helped Alevis to refine their historical identity. However, the political atmosphere provided for language and religious minorities, i.e. the Kurds and Alevis, created an opportunity for the Alevis to make their demands in the public and political scene. However, the serious obstacle is the fact that Erdogan's government considers Alevis minority not a faith, but a civilization with specific cultural values that cannot receives religious privileges from the government.
The role of Alevis in Politics of Turkey
To measure the role of the Alevi religious minority in Turkey's political and cultural sociology, a few important factors should be taken into account:
1. Population density. Alevis comprise 20 percent of Turkey's population, they live in different cities and regions of the country. In fact, Alevis are the second largest religious community in Turkey. They are found in different cities of Turkey such as Anteb (60%), Sivas (70%), Kahramanmaraş (60%), Tokat (70%), Çorum (60%), Amasya (60%), Istanbul (30%), Ankara (30%), Izmir (40%), Apchil (40%), Hatay (30%), Antalya (30%), Malatya (40%) and Erzincan (30%).
2. Rich land sources. Alevis in Turkey have no exclusive economic areas. Like other Turkish citizens, they have similar challenges and opportunities. In other words, they have no resources which can keep them distinct.
3. Neighboring countries which have similar position. No government in the region or in the world shares same cultural norms with Alevis. Although the Syrian authorities are of Alevi origin, Alevism has never been the official ideology of Syria. In recent years, the growth in self-identity of the Alevi community has been more inclined towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. This could be attributed to the cultural depth of Alevis.
4. Historical endurance and identity struggle. Resistance and fights of Turkish Alevis have a long history. During the Ottoman Empire, Alevis suffered years of oppression when tens of thousands of Alevis lost their lives in resistance to Assimilation. During the Republicanism, there have been riots and clashes between Alevis and many fanatical Sunni groups. Apart from the factors behind the events leading to the massacre of individuals and people associated with Alevis, in Alevi populated cities of Dersim (Tunceli), Marash (Kahramanmaraş), Malatya, Sivas and Çorum, it has always represented their perseverance on seeking their historical identity.
5. Wise leadership. Although over the long history of intellectual development, Alevis had strong and charismatic leaders, at the time being they have no such a leader. Turkish Alevi leaders currently do not enjoy a significant spiritual influence and prestige in the Alevi community.
6. Mobilization capability. Turkish Alevi population does not have necessary ethnic, ideological and belief coherence; therefore, they are unlikely to be mobilized in important political issues.
7. Alignment with the international community. The identity discourse of Turkish Alevi community has not been in the focus of attention of the international institutions. Although Alevis have established dozens of organizations and associations in Turkey, Europe and the US to protect their rights, their problems have not received due attention from international institutions. The joining of Turkey to the EU is likely to provide an important opportunity for Alevi civil society activists.
Given the above factors, it should be acknowledged that the Turkish Alevi community is an undeniable reality in the cultural, religious and political scene of Turkey, and its demands and developments could be explained in the framework of Turkey's paradigm of religious minorities. The demands of this community are quite conservative and focused on the secular foundations of government and fulfillment of educational and cultural rights in the context of their ideological and cultural identities rather than separatism and social gaps. Alevis seek recognition of their worship places in the Turkey's Dianat Department, they also ask for recognition of their faith distinctions in the government organizations. Neither the Islamist AKP government nor the former secular governments have clearly responded to these demands. However, the Turkish political scene has provided rare opportunities for cultural and political demands of Alevi community, but the Alevis' major concerns are about religious policies of Erdogan's government which reminds Alevis of the Ottoman era. That's why Turkish government is taking strong measures to refine the cultural practices of Alevis to the extent that some scholars believe that Turkey will face ethnic issues concerning the Turkish Alevis, in addition to that of Kurds. Although the nature of these two phenomena is different, in the absence of proper management it is likely to create a faith-based social rift in Turkey. Political and security activities of Turkish Alevis of Arab origin in Turkey's neighboring countries are well indicative of complexities that could partially be explained based on the theory of the geopolitics of emotions. The geopolitics of emotions as a relatively new approach is among the most stable elements of the human relations and serves as a variable in the analysis of the international situation. Senses of fear, humiliation and hope, elements proposed by the aforementioned theory, could be counted in explaining the future of Turkish Alevis.
However, the role of the Alevi minority is increasing in the political sociology of Turkey. They will certainly organize their social movement, however, it would be in modern forms and there is no need to create classic forms of social movement. Turkish political community has learned that they should not seek an approach towards emergence of a social and political phenomenon; they try to manage the demands of Alevis as long as they pursue their demands within the framework of the government rules. In any case, the religious identity of Alevis in Turkey will experience an intense period of politicization.
