Alwaght | News & Analysis Website

Alwaght - The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt has been experiencing one of the toughest and most intense crises since its founding more than 80 years ago. The crisis stems not only from the oppression and attempts at its destruction by the current regime in Egypt, with the help of its allies and supporters, but also from the growing rift between the organization’s leadership and its base.
It is perhaps the first time in the Brotherhood’s history that the extent of oppression and violence has reached the lower rungs of the organization in a way that has clearly blurred the Brotherhood’s vision and paralyzed its action. Although waves of oppression and persecution from the authorities have marked the Brotherhood’s history, this time, things have been escalated. There are attempts not only to weaken the Brotherhood and tame it, but also to cause it to disintegrate and eliminate it politically and socially.
The MB has been struggling for eight decades to come into power in Egypt, and when it finally did, President Mohamed Morsi, the country's first democratically elected president, lost it in one year – overthrown by a military coup. And now Egypt's military leaders are back.
While current President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi has said "there is room for everyone in Egypt," the continuing repression of the Muslim Brotherhood dims any expectations of reconciliation in the near term. But the MB still has considerable power, even though it has been toppled from ruling power, swept from the streets, and many of its leaders are under arrest or on the run. MB has almost more than 1 million members, and it commands the allegiance of more than 20 percent of the Egyptian population, many of whom look to it for social assistance that the state does not provide. And it has demonstrated its ability to field fervent supporters who are ready to die.
After the steps taken by al-Sisi to isolate the MB from the political arena, several strategies were adopted by the MB in order to preserve its political life in Egypt under those extreme conditions. These strategies included: 1) Forming the National Coalition to Support the Legitimacy and Reject the Coup, 2) Resorting to demonstrations and civil disobedience, 3) Founding of the Revolutionary Council of the MB outside the country, 4) Supporting the Takfiri terrorist groups in Egypt whom with they share common benefits against the current ruling power in Egypt.
The recent events faced by the Muslim Brotherhood, during the past two years, led the group to stand at a crossroad being puzzled for which road to chose. So what are the strategic options on the MB’s table in order to come back to power? Or what are the future scenarios for the MB in Egypt and how might their destination be?
Possible Future Scenarios
•    The regime remains committed to the goal of eradicating the MB, even though it lacks the resources to effectively do so. The MB continues to face a ruthless crackdown by the regime, including arbitrary arrests, frozen assets, and violent confrontations.
•    The Muslim Brotherhood could dive back underground. The organization has experience operating in secrecy, while still providing social services, building party membership and cultivating foreign ties.
•    The Muslim Brotherhood could opt for continued street confrontations. These create martyrs, which may further energize the party's base. Harsh government responses to provocative acts by the Brotherhood can arouse sympathy for their cause, prompt international condemnations and harm the Egyptian economy — especially tourism, the industry the government most relies on to provide jobs. This is a two-edged sword as it risks antagonizing Egyptians who will hold the Brotherhood responsible for the turmoil and its costs. Also street fighting is an unequal contest
•    The next phase will be terrorist attacks. The Brotherhood lacks guns and probably wants to avoid living down to a terrorist label. And once the violence starts leaders may not be able to rein in a more violent fringe.
•    The MB could negotiate with the regime for a return to the political formula that was conducted under former president Hosni Mubarak—limited political inclusion of the Brotherhood within certain regime-determined redlines.
•    The Brotherhood splits into two main fragments: moderates who view conventional Brotherhood policy as too confrontational, and hardliners who view current policy as too compromising and also ideologically incorrect.
•    The organization recognizes the failures of its current protests and withdraws from political activity, focusing on an internal ideological reinvention.
It is unlikely from the MB to go for violence and terrorism because the consequences are known to be not for their own good. Whereas the political and flexible choice is mostly preferred by the MB since it proved to have good results, as bringing it to power in 2012.
This time the political choice adopted by the MB will be built on its previous experience with modifications to the mistakes conducted at the time of Morsi. In other words the MB will benefit from its political history since the beginning of its journey till 2012, as well as taking into account the experience gained during their ruling period after the revolution in 2011, in order to plan for a more prosperous political future.
It still remains for the coming years to tell us which definite strategy it will adopt through its political journey in order to come back to power in Egypt. Is it going to make deal with the regime, or will it dig back to secrecy and 'camouflage', or will it escalate its activities, or will it undergo a rehabilitation process?