Alwaght- On Sunday, Turkish parliament after a year of hemming and hawing with the West finally approved Sweden’s membership to NATO, closing one of the most controversial cases in relations between Ankara and the Western military bloc.
The big inter-NATO challenge started with the Russian special military operation in Ukraine earlier in 2022 that unleashed a political security and political quake to the whole Europe, and actually Finland and Sweden applied for the NATO membership as an aftermath of the war.
This application put the West under the Turkish mercy as the NATO accession mechanism stipulates that an all-member agreement is needed for a new member to be taken in.
Though during last year the main pretext for Erdogan to give Sweden a green light was Stockholm hosting what Ankara called terrorist groups, it was obvious from the beginning that the Turkish-Western geopolitical differences over the past decade totally overshadowed Ankara-Brussles relations, to an extent that even there were bilateral threats of expulsion or exit from the NATO.
Turkish purchase of advanced Russian S-400 air defense systems, Washington and NATO military support to the Syrian Kurds, Turkish maintaining of close relations with Western-sanctioned Russia and Iran and finally Turkey’s neutral position in the Ukraine war have inflamed these differences to an uncontrollable level.
However, Erdogan’s very shaky victory in the 2023 presidential election and his attempt to restore Turkey’s ailing economy these days motivated a change in Ankara’s foreign policy toward de-escalation with the West. Turkey finally agreed to Sweden’s membership after Stockholm ostensibly vowed to not host Ankara opponents. Ankara also quitted its demand for F-35 fighter jets and agreed to procurement of updated F-16 fighters.
Now with these political and military gives and takes, can we expect end to Turkey-NATO chill and start of a new season with boosted cooperation?
NATO-Turkey differences, a fire under the ash
Turkey has risen out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire that ruled for 600 years over three continents, in the Muslim world, and parts of Europe. Erdogan’s Turkey tries to represent this history of powerful role playing on the world stage, and the instrument for this play is the unique geopolitical position of Turkey as a land bridge connecting the West to Central Asia, Arab world, and the East. In fact, although Turkey has established a close partnership with the West through NATO membership and deepening trade relations with the European Union, Erdogan’s main goal is to present the country as an independent power with a unique national identity. He ultimately seeks to improve Turkey’s international status and establish it as a major player in international developments beyond the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.
However, experts say, the identity differences with the West keep the European Union doors closed to Ankara membership despite many efforts by the Turkish officials to match themselves with various European conditions. These differences also include human rights views, Eastern-Islamic identity of Turkey which is incongruous to the Christian identity of the EU.
These identity gaps with the West have never been digested by the relatively massive political and economic relations of Ankara and the West, and every now and then resurface with escalation of geopolitical tensions. For example, the US President Joe Biden officially recognized in 2021 the Ottoman genocide of Armenians in the early 20th century, infuriating Ankara.
Additionally, in the foreign policy and goals of Turkey designed for the years to come there are many distinctions with the NATO policies and strategies.
During the tensions with the West, Turkey tended to strengthen relations with the two Eastern superpowers, namely China and Russia, and expanded its economic, political and even military relations with these NATO rivals. It has even further strengthened ties with Beijing, which became Ankara’s largest foreign trade partner in 2021. In 2015, Turkey joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which has given it access to non-Western financing for infrastructure projects, including nuclear and coal power plants, by attracting billions of dollars in Chinese foreign investment, loans and other financial deals. At the same time, Turkey did not join the West’s propaganda against the human rights situation in China, especially in the Uyghurs Muslim minority case. This is while in 2009, Erdogan described China’s policy towards the Uyghurs as “genocide”, but since then, Ankara did not raise this issue publicly.
The Turkish relationship with Russia is even more complicated than this. Even during his de-escalation with the West, Erdogan has not ditched close ties to Moscow and, just to the Western surprise, he has not grounded or sold the S-400 air defenses. Ankara and Moscow are also cooperating on infrastructure projects such as the TurkStream natural gas pipeline and Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. Turkey, which is heavily dependent on Russian energy, has not recognized the European energy embargo on Moscow, and despite taking some sympathetic measures with NATO, such as sending drones to Ukraine, banning the passage of Russian warships from the Bosphorus Strait, and condemning Russia’s Ukraine war, it has always been cautious not to burn all of its bridges, and mainly focused on mediation in the Russian-Western crisis.
Turkish movement to defense independence
Though NATO has always tried to advertise itself as a comprehensive treaty with political, military, security, social, and cultural aspects, the primary goal of the appliers for its membership is access to its military and security protection. This is not true about Turkey, however, as Ankara over the past decade has accused the military bloc of not adequately meeting its military needs while generously arming its regional rivals.
This Turkish protest boiled over with Turkey buying advanced Russian arms, causing a controversy inside NATO that was not eased even with the US promises of arms sales to Turkey. In 2019, Ankara defied Washington’s warnings about purchase of state-of-the-art S-400 missile defense batteries.
Ankara argued that it needs to upgrade its air defenses as it was denied the US-made Patriot systems. This action motivated Western sanctions against Turkey and cost it its share in the F-35 manufacturing program. Washington’s excuse was that the Russian technicians who maintain the S-400s can crack the codes of the stealth capabilities of these jets, a position that practically portrayed Turkey as an unreliable ally for NATO because it was cooperating with the main and primary enemy of this alliance.
This situation has now pushed Turkey towards military self-sufficiency, especially in the field of strategic weapons, as after the success in the production of military drones, the construction of warships and unmanned boats, and recently advanced fighters, have been put on the agenda of the Ankara, something showing that Ankara is taking a clear path to reduce its military dependence on NATO. This growing self-sufficiency will certainly increase Turkey’s maneuvering power in the face of NATO’s macropolitics in geopolitical cases, and this means expecting the deepening of their gaps in the future.
Maintaining supremacy of Turkey’s rivals in the Mediterranean
But pessimism about end of Turkey-NATO chill is not limited to the prospects, but also this reality reflected itself in recent bilateral Washington-Ankara agreement regarding Turkish agreement to Sweden NATO membership.
Relations with Greece and Cyprus are currently the most controversial case of regional competition for Turkey. This is a long-term conflict that has intensified in recent years due to the efforts of both sides to discover energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean and has even gone to the point of war. This dispute has even involved the EU and other NATO members, especially France, in the dispute in favor of Greece.
In such circumstances, Turkey’s attempt to purchase F-35s and then agreeing to upgraded F-16s, as well as upgrading its old-generation F-16s, has been interpreted as driven by a will to maintain and improve military deterrence against Greece and its European allies.
Greece and Turkey are at an intensive military competition. Athens has recently ordered 24 French-made Dassault Rafale (6 new and 18 used), and three frigates.
Earlier, ex-Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said that Greece needs to improve its armed forces capabilities with regard to the Turkish movements.
The new Turkish-American military deal includes new F-16s, 48 new engines, 149 AN/APG-81 radar systems, and 168 Viper electronic warfare kits.
Greece, however, will receive 40 F-35 fighters with a purchase deal worth $8.6 billion, which includes various additional systems. These jets are slated to replace the aging fleet of F-4 Phantom and Mirage-2000.
In other words, what happened in recent Washington-Ankara deal was the US double-crossing of Turkey, since along with signing the deal, the White House gave a green light for additional F-35s to Athens, allowing the past power status to continue in Greek favor.
It finally must be said that Turkish tactical retreat and flexibility to Sweden membership to NATO should not be seen as an end to Ankara-Brussles gaps, since this flexibility is unilateral and happening in a state of Turkish weakness and certainly Erdogan who will hold the power at least for the next 5 years will press ahead with his programs for military independence and self-sufficiency.
